Imholz ./. Emil Gisler: Is coming up with inventions a side task of a sales rep?

Reading time: 6 minutes

Case No. S2023_001 | ‘Bitumen / asphalt recycling’
👉 Order of 15 February 2023
👉 Judgment of 11 April 2023

Environmental sustainability is a huge thing these days. It affects almost every industry. Even roadworks. Did you ever wonder what happens with waste asphalt? Formerly, it was dumped in landfill. Not so anymore. Recycling has arrived in this industry, too. One approach is to crush and screen the recovered asphalt, and to re-use it as gravel or in mixed products. The common disadvantage is that components get more and more fragmented / the fine portion increases. Further, the valuable bitumen is functionally lost.

Obviously, there is still room for improvement, and this is what the present case is all about.

GIPO logo

An employee of Emil Gisler AG Maschinenbau und Hydraulik (the defendant) made an invention pertaining to recycling of asphalt and bitumen, and reported this invention to his employer. This employee, Pius IMHOLZ, has meanwhile left Emil Gisler and founded his own company in order to commercialize this invention, i.e. Imholz GmbH (the plaintiff). But, here’s the issue: His former employer filed the respective patent application for this invention in their own name. It’s the Swiss patent application 70/2022 (still unpublished, but expected to be published in about a month; stay tuned!). Accordingly, it’s a classic dispute concerning the ownership of an invention and the respective patent application.

Swiss law is pretty clear with respect to employee inventions:

    • If an employee comes up with an invention in the course of his work for the employer and in performance of his contractual obligations, such an invention belongs to the employer without any further ado; Art. 332 para. 1 CO. These are so-called ‘Diensterfindungen’.
    • Further, the employer may also reserve the right to acquire inventions made by the employee in the course of his work for the employer but not in performance of his contractual obligations. These are so-called ‘Gelegenheitserfindungen’. This requires a written agreement. The employee must notify the employer of such inventions, and the employer must then inform the employee within six months if he wishes to acquire the invention or release it to the employee. See Art. 332 paras. 2 and 3 CO.

To date, the facts are only told by the plaintiff. (Clearly, defendant did not confirm plaintiff’s summary; they reserved the right to put everything into perspective in main proceedings. They just chose their battles wisely: A register ban will hardly ever be denied, anyway.) So, this is what we know for now: Pius IMHOLZ informed his employer about the existence of his invention on 25 October 2021, and disclosed the details thereof in early November 2021. In co-operation with patent attorneys a draft patent application was compiled, the content of which was approved by Pius IMHOLZ on 20 December 2021. On the same date, at the latest, Pius IMHOLZ made clear that he did not intend to give away (t)his invention for free. The defendant (more precisely, their attorneys-at-law since the filing receipt was apparently addressed to them) nevertheless filed the patent application in their own name on 25 January 2022.

The parties could not reach an out of court settlement since then, which is why plaintiff went to court. In particular, the parties dissent about whether the invention at stake is a ‘Diensterfindung’ in accordance with Art. 332 para. 1 CO. Note that Pius IMHOLZ was employed as a sales representative, not in R&D. Still, defendant claims that coming up with the invention was part of Pius IMHOLZ’s side tasks as sales representative.

In co-pending main proceedings (case no. O2023_002), Imholz seeks assignment of the patent application. The present summary proceedings were all about a register ban. With an ex parte order of 15 February 2023, the President acting as single judge held that the invention at stake was quite likely a ‘Gelegenheitserfindung’. In the absence of any written agreement in the sense of Art. 332 para. 2 CO on file, a register ban was issued. The register ban was confirmed after the defendant had been heard, with judgment of 11 April 2023.

A closer look a the technology

It appears that GIPO began to showcase its asphalt competence in 2021, e.g. when plant no. 1’000 was commissioned in August 2021 (mentioning that bitumen is separated from stone, without breaking the stone), and with an advertisement in asphalt 5/2021 (published in August 2021, too):

 

A hyperlinked category ‘Asphaltaufbereitung’ on GIPO’s website was archived for the first time when crawled on 28 December 2021; the respective hyperlink itself was crawled only on 29 January 2022 for the first time (i.e., a few days after the filing date), with a brochure about GIPO’s asphalt processing / recycling technology.

Here’s how GIPO currently advertises its approach to bitumen / asphalt recycling:

It will be interesting to see (around end of July 2023) what the invention of the Swiss patent application 70/2022 is all about.

✍ Sarah HENTSCHEL / Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. S2023_001 | ‘Bitumen / asphalt recycling’
👉 Order of 15 February 2023
👉 Judgment of 11 April 2023

Imholz GmbH
./.
Emil Gisler AG

Single Judge:

    • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER

Court Clerk:

    • Sven BUCHER

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

    • Dr. Cyrill RIEDER (FMP)
    • Dr. Peter WALSER (Frei), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant:

    • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
    • Nicola BENZ (MLL)
    • Dr. Ulrike CIESLA (MLL), assisting in patent matters

JUDGMENT

EX PARTE ORDER

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Thou shalt not take photos or make recordings in the courtroom

Reading time: 3 minutes

Case No. O2022_003 | Hearing of 14 June 2023 | ‘Vertuo® / assignment action’

Nestlé and K-fee have currently locked jaws on various issues. First, K-fee asserts that Nestlé infringes on three patents with their Vertuo® pods, i.e.

See this Blog here for some background information. The FPC has dismissed this claim only recently; see here. (I will review this judgment in more detail on this Blog soon; stay tuned.) K-fee will likely appeal to the Supreme Court.

Separately, Nestlé has sued K-fee for assignment / unlawful usurpation of the very same patents. While the Swiss national validations of EP 362, EP 207 and EP 209 are the subject of proceedings at the Swiss FPC, the remainder of the pretty extensive patent family is being litigated at the Regional Court of Düsseldorf (Germany); see K-fee’s redacted Statement of Claim.

The hearing in the Swiss proceedings took place earlier this week, on June 14. I could not make it to the hearing, (un)fortunately. I’m currently on holiday with my three blondes … 😎. Which is why I cannot really report much about the current state of play. However, I have been told that a member of the public took pictures and made recordings during the hearing. Better don’t do this. It’s strictly prohibited; Art. 15 PR-PatC. (If you wish to make the argument that this prohibition does not apply because the hearing was not “in the rooms of the FPC”, go for it. I wouldn’t.) The President expelled the misbehaving person from the court room. To the best of my knowledge, it’s the first time that this happened.

Darn, something actually happens and I’m not there!

✍ MW

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2022_003 | Hearing of 14 June 2023 | ‘Vertuo / assignment action’

Société des Produits Nestlé SA
./.
K-fee System GmbH

Panel of judges:

    • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER
    • Dr. Tobias BREMI
    • Dr. Lorenzo PARRINI

Court Clerk:

    • Sven BUCHER

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

Representative(s) of Defendant:

    • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
    • Dr. Ulrike CIESLA (MLL), assisting in patent matters

ANNOUNCEMENT

PATENTS IN SUIT

EP 3 023 362 B1:

EP 3 521 207 B1:

EP 3 521 209 B1:

STATEMENT OF CLAIM 

Assignment action in Germany

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It’s not your patent application! Even if you had told me: I already knew!

Reading time: 5 minutes

Case No. O2019_001 | Judgment of 16 March 2022 | ‘Abtretungsklage; Tenside’

Good Soaps logo

We have reported about this fiercly fought assignment action already several times; see e.g. this Blog here, here and here. Werner & Mertz (well known e.g. for its brand Frosch®) had sued Compad Consulting for lack of entitlement to EP 2 592 134 (cf. the European Patent Register for bibliographic information), i.e. unlawful usurpation thereof. Compad’s licensee of EP 134 is Good Soaps.

Frosch® in the rape

Generally speaking, the invention pertains to the use of sustainably sourced detergents in cleaning agents. The independent claim of EP 134 is much more lengthy, though. In particular, rapeseed methyl ester ethoxylates (rapeseed MEEs) appear to be of most interest. In plaintiff’s view, the «basic concept of the invention» was the replacement of the petroleum-based surfactant Lutensol AO7 with rapeseed MEE in a certain Frosch® washing agent, with satisfactory washing results.

As usual, the burden of proof was on Werner & Mertz to establish that (i) their employee made the invention; (ii) how / when this invention was communicated to the alleged usurpator; and (iii) how this invention is reflected in the patent (application) at stake.

The parties fundamentally dissented about what exactly had been communicated in a seemingly critical meeting of 27 August 2009 of Mr QUADE (with Werner & Mertz since about 40y) and Ms SCHNEIDER (formerly with Kolb, now with Good Soaps), and not even witness testimonies could finally clarify this issue.

w rapeseed MEE

However, this turned out to be not decisive anyway. The judgment holds that defendant was able to prove a fact in support of his position, i.e. that even if the alleged facts had been communicated by Mr QUADE in that meeting, this information amounted to nothing more than what Ms SCHNEIDER had alread known at the time: There was already an Ecover® product on the market at the time that contained rapeseed MEE as a detergent. Accordingly, the judgment holds that the complaint has to be dismissed.

This is not the first time that the «prior knowledge» exculpation has appeared in case law. It is long-established practice e.g. in Germany; see e.g. X ZR 79/07 – Steuervorrichtung:

buried information

However, to the best of my knowledge, this is a first in Swiss case law — and it appears essentially without any further ado. I would have liked to learn a bit more about the legal reasoning, even though the facts of the present case were pretty straight forward in this respect.

What would it generally take to establish prior knowledge of the invention? What is the necessary level of awareness of this information? E.g., is it sufficient that the information was somewhere buried in an archive, and maybe essentially forgotten only until one has been told again?

Anyway, subjective «prior knowledge» of the allegedly usurpated invention must not be confused with an objective lack of novelty: Patentability of the allegedly usurpated invention is irrelevant in an assignment action.

The judgment may still be appealed to the Supreme Court.

UPDATE 26 May 2022: As confirmed by the FPC, no appeal has been filed; the decision is final.

/MW

Header image courtesy of Christopher Gilb / Luzerner Zeitung.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2019_001 | Judgment of 16 March 2022 | ‘Abtretungsklage; Tenside’

Werner & Mertz
./.
Compad Consulting GmbH (trading as Compad Finance)

Panel of Judges:

    • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER
    • Dr. Tobias BREMI
    • Dr. Frank SCHAGER

Judge-rapporteur:

    • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

    • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

Representative(s) of Defendant:

JUDGMENT IN FULL

PATENT APPLICATION IN SUIT

Clean version of the DREX, i.e. the version for which the EPO indicated its intention to grant a patent:

Application as filed, published as EP 2 592 134 A2:


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Laurastar and Innosteam have settled

Case No. O2018_016 | Decision of 20 May 2020

Reading time: 2 minutes
Laurastar logo

We have reported earlier on this Blog here about the litigation betwwen Laurastar and Innosteam about ownership of (the national phases of) two PCT applications, WO 2018/006994 A1 and WO 2018/036653 A1; see the EPO Register here and here. The patent applications are about devices and methods for producing instant steam (WO’994) and instant hot water (WO’653), for use e.g. in devices for ironing.

Innosteam logo

Nothing has surfaced after the main hearing of 25 June 2019. But now, I came across the FPC’s decision of 20 May 2020 to close the proceedings because the parties have ultimately settled, after a series of suspensions of the further course of the proceedings after the main hearing.

Laurastar is bearing the court fees; no party compensations are awarded.

I understand that the so-called InstantSteam feature is still a major selling point of Innosteam, the efficiency of which purportedly allows for the commercialization of a high end ironing system at an affordable price.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2018_016 | Decision of 20 May 2020

Laurastar SA
./.
Innosteam Swiss SA

Panel of Judges:

    • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER
    • Dr. Ralph SCHLOSSER
    • Dr. Giovanni GERVASIO

Judge-rapporteur:

    • Dr. Giovanni GERVASIO

Court Clerk:

    • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

Representative(s) of Defendant:

DECISION IN FULL

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A very serious soap opera

Reading time: 6 minutes

Case No. O2019_001 | Hearing of 16 September 2020

Frosch® product

As mentioned earlier on this Blog here, Werner & Mertz (well known e.g. for its brands Erdal® and Frosch®) has sued Compad Consulting GmbH for lack of entitlement to a patent application, i.e. unlawful usurpation thereof.

The patent application at stake is EP 2 592 134; the patent application is licensed to the Swiss start-up company Good Soaps. See the European Patent Register for further bibliographic information.

The file wrapper at the EPO is telling: The complaint of 9 January 2019, the reply of 20 September 2019 (including all appendices) as well as the comments on the rejoinder of 5 December 2019 are available online. The instruction hearing took place on 8 July 2019 — without a settlement being reached.

There had already been some attention in the media a while ago (see e.g. here and here), when the defendant had lodged a press release. Apparently, the plaintiff now also approached the media shortly before the hearing. SRF reported again about this case yesterday in Regionaljournal Zentralschweiz:

Frankly, I am not going to participate in reading the tea leafs here, trying to conclude something from the fact that the inventor has waived her right to be publicly mentioned; or that the applicant is not Good Soaps itself, but rather a consulting firm that has given a license to Good Soaps. These things per se may well happen for good and serious reasons. And I cannot readily spot any troll-like behaviour, either.

UPDATE 18 September 2020:

For some strange reason, the designation of inventor is available in the online file wrapper at the EPO, contrary to R. 144 (c) EPC.

In the end, for an assignment action to be successful, a plaintiff has to prove the following:

    1. that he actually made the invention on his own (when, where and how);
    2. how the defendant was made aware of this invention; and
    3. how this invention is reflected in the application(s) in suit.

See e.g. O2012_001 (r 27) and O2015_009.

The main hearing took place earlier today, and it was definitely one worth attending.

Good Soaps product

Ms Regine SCHNEIDER had met with some people of Werner & Mertz on 27 August 2009 in Mainz, in particular with Mr Karl-Heinz QUADE. That is one of the few things on which the parties can agree. At that time, Ms SCHNEIDER had been employed by Kolb, as head of the business unit New Business. I understood from the pleadings that Ms SCHNEIDER had been decruited on the very next day, i.e. 28 August 2009, and that she was immediately released from work because Kolb closed down the whole business unit. Accordingly, it will be decisive whether the invention — as claimed in the application at stake, or at least the basic concept thereof — had been communicated by Mr QUADE to Ms SCHNEIDER in that meeting.

Evidently, the content of this single meeting is of critical importance. Since there is only very limited written evidence in this respect (only an agenda or invitation, in my understanding), witness testimony will likely be decisive. Accordingly, Ms SCHNEIDER was deposed as a witness today. To the best of my knowledge, this was actually the first time that a witness has been publicly deposed in a main hearing at the FPC. Ms SCHNEIDER was first deposed by the President and the judge-rapporteur, and both parties were given the opportunity to ask follow-up questions. This was actually a pretty smooth exercise.

Frog’s home turf?

But, maybe, Mr QUADE remembers things differently(?). Unfortunately, we did not learn more about this meeting from his perspective today. I understood from the pleadings that the defendant had pressed criminal charges against Mr QUADE, for some wrongdoing in connection with the present matter, and that he was therefore prevented from being deposed as a witness in the hearing today.  The FPC has apparently initiated proceedings for judicial assistance of the German authorities, to have Mr QUADE deposed in Germany. Defendant’s counsel requested the FPC to reconsider this procedural move: Even if Mr QUADE would confirm all that has been asserted by the plaintiff by now, it would still not be sufficient for the plaintiff to fulfill all three criteria as outlined above. Note that judicial assistance might easily take a further 4-30(!) months.

The further course of the proceedings is not yet cast in stone. If the FPC abstains from having Mr QUADE deposed, the judgment would be issued as a next step. If Mr QUADE is being deposed, the parties will again have an opportunity to comment on his testimony, be it in writing or yet another hearing.

UPDATE 3 January 2022: A new (final) hearing has been scheduled for 24 January 2022 (comments on the witness testimony of Mr Quade). Further the full minutes of the main hearing of 16 September 2020 as well as the discontinuation orders on the criminal investigations against Mr Quade and Mr Eberhardt are arvailable from the EPO docket.

Reported by Martin WILMING

Credit: Header image by Karsten Lamprecht from Pixabay

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2019_001 | Hearing of 16 September 2020

Werner & Mertz
./.
Compad Consulting GmbH

Panel of Judges:

    • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER
    • Dr. Tobias BREMI
    • Dr. Frank SCHAGER

Judge-rapporteur:

    • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

    • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

Representative(s) of Defendant:

ANNOUNCEMENT

PATENT APPLICATION IN SUIT

Clean version of the DREX, i.e. the version for which the EPO indicated its intention to grant a patent:

 

Application as filed, published as EP 2 592 134 A2:


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Compad Consulting and Werner & Mertz litigating over entitlement to a patent

Reading time: 2 minutes

As reported by Christopher GILB in the Luzerner Zeitung today, there is some litigation going on at the FPC about entitlement to a European patent pertaining to a washing agent that is free from palm oil.

Where’s the patent?

It appears that Werner & Mertz (well known e.g. for its brands Erdal® and Frosch®) has sued the Swiss start-up company Good Soaps for lack of entitlement to the patent, i.e. unlawful usurpation thereof.

The patent has not been identified in the news. I could not leave it at that and did my homework. The patent application at stake is EP 2 592 134 »; the currently registered applicant is Compad Consulting GmbH. See the European Patent Register for further information. The file wrapper is telling: The complaint of 9 January 2019, the reply of 20 September 2019 (including all appendices) as well as the comments on the rejoinder of 5 December 2019 are available online. The instruction hearing took place on 8 July 2019 — without a settlement being reached.

The main hearing is said to be scheduled for 16 September 2020. I trust this will get interesting …

UPDATE 19 August 2020:

The official announcement of the main hearing has just been published by the FPC. No surprises anymore, it’s indeed all about EP 2 592 134 ».

Reported by Martin WILMING

Header image courtesy of T. K. Naliaka, under CC BY-SA 4.0

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2019_001

Werner & Mertz
./.
Compad Consulting GmbH

Panel of Judges:

    • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER
    • Dr. Tobias BREMI
    • Dr. Frank SCHAGER

Judge-rapporteur:

    • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

    • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

Representative(s) of Defendant / Counterclaimant:

PATENT APPLICATION IN SUIT

Clean version of the DREX, i.e. the version for which the EPO indicated its intention to grant a patent:

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Of course I am in shape: Round is a shape …

Reading time: 8 minutes

Case No. O2017_002 | Decision of 8 May 2020 » | ‘Freiform-Schneidverfahren’

We have reported about the main hearing on this Blog here ». From the pleadings at the hearing, I had expected a pretty straight-forward outcome. But when I had downloaded the decision, I panicked: 110 pages(!), a decision of epic length. When will I ever find time to read all this? But in the end it was not half as bad: One can thumb through more than half of the decision without missing much: It takes essentially the first 65(!) pages to recite the various requests of the parties during the proceedings.

The mountain in labour

Against the background of the pleadings at the main hearing, the conclusions of the decision indeed do not come as a big surprise anymore: EP(CH) 864 » is declared null and void; Bystronic’s further requests are dismissed, as well as Tomologic’s counterclaim for infringement. Appeal proceedings are currently pending at the Supreme Court.

Besides EP(CH) 864 », the further members of this patent family in other jurisdictions had also been at stake: Bystronic had requested assignment to co-ownership. Yet another patent family was at stake with respect to co-ownership, i.e WO 2012/136262 A1; grant of a European patent had already been intended, but proceedings at the EPO have been stayed in view of the entitlement proceedings at the FPC.

Now that the outcome is essentially in line with what we had learned in the main hearing », let’s have a look at some procedural aspects, and some issues of potentially more general interest.

Competency of the FPC

Competency of the FPC to hear all aspects of the case was not a given, since e.g. Bystronic had requested that foreign members of the patent families were assigned to co-ownership. It was only due to a Service Agreement between the parties, i.e. a choice of forum clause contained therein, that the FPC’s competency was acknowledged in toto.

based on a choice of forum agreement between the parties.
the judge-rapporteur’s expert opinion

Parties sometimes feel that the judge-rapporteur’s expert opinion should have dealt with yet further aspects of the case: Why didn’t he/she take a deep(er) dive? The decision holds that the parties do not have the right to have all the questions which might arise and which concern technical issues be dealt with in a specialised judge’s opinion; see ¶ 32. This is even more so in cases like the present one when more than 20 auxiliary requests are pending (which ultimately all failed for clarity issues and insufficiency of disclosure of a feature that was contained in all requests). It is at the judge-rapporteur’s discretion to make a reasonable choice of aspects to be dealt with in the expert opinion:

Do the examples have to be covered by the claim?

In general terms with respect to claim construction, the decision holds in ¶ 43 that a claim shall be read in such a way that the embodiments disclosed in the patent are literally covered. Applying this to the case at hand, the decision holds in ¶ 46, that one has to arrive at a certain conclusion since the embodiments disclosed in the specification must be covered (literally):

I have stumbled over the same wording several times in recent decisions of the FPC — and I am still not really comfy with it. My experience as a patent attorney is different: It frequently happens during prosecution that claims are amended in such a way that specific examples (only some or even all) disclosed in the specification are not covered anymore by the amended claim. Clearly, both the attorney and the examiner should spot and remove such inconsistencies before grant. But it just doesn’t happen, quite often.

By way of example, if a claim is amended during prosecution by specifying that a certain element is circular, and the patent as granted contains various embodiments of circular shape and still an embodiment where that element is rectangular, there is no way in my perception that circular in the claim should be construed such that it covers a rectangle.

On the other a hand, when the claim says round and the embodiments disclose only various polygons, chances are that polygons might well read on round(?). Subject to discussion, of course. But I feel that it is in no way a universal truth that a claim has to be construed in a way that it literally covers the disclosed embodiments, no matter what. Rather, it depends.

Accordingly, the German Supreme Court has held several times that the correct claim construction may well lead to a situation where only some or, in exceptional cases, even no embodiment at all is covered by the claim (see e.g.  X ZR 43/13Rotorblätter (¶ 16) and X ZR 35/11Zugriffsrechte (¶ 26)):

Eine Auslegung des Patentanspruchs, die zur Folge hätte, dass keines der […] geschilderten Ausführungsbeispiele vom Gegenstand des Patents erfasst würde, kommt […] nur in Betracht, wenn andere Auslegungsmöglichkeiten, die zumindest zur Einbeziehung eines Teils der Ausführungsbeispiele führen, zwingend ausscheiden oder wenn sich aus dem Patentanspruch hinreichend deutliche Anhaltspunkte dafür entnehmen lassen, dass tatsächlich etwas beansprucht wird, das so weitgehend von der Beschreibung abweicht.

In English:

A claim construction which would have the consequence that none of the described embodiments would be covered by the patent is only possible if other ways of claim construction which lead to the coverage of at least some of the embodiments are definitely ruled out or if there are sufficiently clear indications from the patent claim that something is actually claimed which deviates so widely from the description.

Co-inventorship

What’s the threshold for someone’s contribution to be considered relevant enough to give rise to co-inventorship?

The decision holds in ¶ 62 that a co-inventor is someone who has participated creatively in the development of the invention. Mere workmanship is not sufficient to be a co-inventor, but it is not required that the contribution in itself is inventive or even that it fulfils the conditions for patentability in itself.

mere constructional conribution does not suffice.

In the case at hand, the decision holds that mere evaluation of an invention-in-progress is not a creative / substantial input to the invention per se:

is not a creative / substantial contribution to the invention per se.

This example appears straight-forward to me. On the other side of the threshold, an input that is more than standard workmanship (or which is substantial; see ¶ 69) but not yet inventive in itself is sufficient for someone to be a co-inventor. Again, there may well be clear cases, e.g. when a car is claimed and the invention is all about an engine for the car, and someone only contributes to the subject-matter of the claim that the car has wheels (guess what!). But most cases won’t be this easy to decide.

On a sidenote, the decision also holds that the inventor has to be a human. Well, that is the current mainstream approach, see e.g. the EPO’s DABUS decisions and a recent report from the Five IP Offices:

ManMachine

But there are certainly AI-generated inventions around; see e.g. The Artificial Inventor Project, and it is a pity that the law — at least as it stands and as it is currently interpreted by the offices and courts(?) — deprives AI-generated inventions from patent protection. But the discussion about this and further AI-related aspects has only just begun.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2017_002 | Decision of 8 May 2020 » | ‘Freiform-Schneidverfahren’

Bystronic Laser AG
./.
Tomologic AB

Panel of Judges:

    • Dr. Thomas LEGLER
    • Dr. Tobias BREMI
    • Christoph MÜLLER
    • Christophe SAAM
    • Dr. Rudolf RENTSCH

Judge-rapporteur:

    • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

    • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

    • Dr. Markus FRICK (Walder Wyss)
    • Manuel BIGLER (Walder Wyss)
    • Dr. Peter WALSER (Frei), assisting in patent matters
    • Dr. Markus MÜLLER (Frei), assisting in patent matters

Former representative(s) of Plaintiff:

    • Catherine WEISSER
    • Paul ROSENICH (PPR), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant / Counterclaimant:

    • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
    • Martin TOLETI (Blum), assisting in patent matters
    • Dr. Christoph ENGELBRECHT (Blum), assisting in patent matters

DECISION

PATENT IN SUIT

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A dossier that has risen like yeast dough

Reading time: 7 minutes

Case No. O2017_002 | Hearing of 5 February 2020

On 5 February 2020 the main hearing in this matter took place at the FPC. We have reported on this matter already on 3 February 2017 when ex parte interim measures had been denied (see this Blog here) and on 26 May 2017 when EPO prosecution and opposition proceedings had been stayed (see this Blog here).

Tomologic logo

In first place, Tomologic‘s EP 2 485 864 B1 (see EPO Register) is at stake. Bystronic requested that EP(CH) 864 be declared null and void, or that it be assigned to co-ownership as an auxiliary measure. Some further patents or patent applications are concerned in addition, in particular national parts of WO 2012/136262 A1 such as e.g. EP 2 694 241; see EPO Register).

Tomologic has countersued for infringement of EP 864 by Bystronic’s software product Bysoft 7 with the implemented function to create cutting plans:

As an introductory remark, the presiding judge invited Tomologic to provide a translation of a Swedish decision that had been submitted earlier; unfortunately, it was not indicated in the hearing what that decision was all about. Even though Bystronic had not commented on that Swedish document, the court felt «not at ease» with having a document on file which is not comprehensible for the judges.

Both parties gave PPT presentations. The presiding judge reminded the parties that this case was already extraordinarily voluminous, even before oral pleadings, and that there was no need to repeat the assertions already made in writing.

Clunky mike

Tomologic used flipchart sketches and short films in further support of the PPT presentation. In our perception, flipcharts are generally welcomed by the court. But how tho deal with the table-top microphone in such situations? Any drawer / presenter should be prepared to be reprimanded by the court clerk to use the microphone. Furthermore, flip chart collages, once they are completed, shall form part of the minutes and should not be re-arranged too heavily in later pleadings.

On the merits of the case, we understand that the judge-rapporteur’s expert opinion had been in favor of Bystronic, at least to the extent nullity of EP 864 is concerned. Claim 1 of EP 864 as granted reads as follows (underlined feature amended over claim 1 as originally filed; potentially distinguishing feature over the prior art highlighted in yellow):


Claim 1 of EP 864, marked-up

Method for machine cutting several parts out of a piece of material using a beam cutting technology, said method providing a set of controlling rules and variables for cutting two dimensional shapes or patterns, where one rule or a combination of several rules are used for the cutting operation depending on the shape or pattern to be cut, said shape or pattern forming said parts out of said piece of material, characterised in that said set of controlling rules comprises rules for the forming of a cluster of parts with free form shapes, said parts being positioned so close to each other so that only the thickness of one cut made by the cutting beam is found between adjacent parts whenever the shape of said parts allows it.

It appears that the introduction of «one cut made by» may have caused an issue under Art. 123(2) EPC. Further, the correct understanding of (rules for the forming of a cluster of parts with) «free form shapes» in the characterizing part of the claim was a big issue in the hearing.  In Tomologic’s view, this was a reference to «free form nesting». Free form nesting is a technique which — in contrast to «rectangular nesting» or «rectangular bounding box nesting» — arranges free form parts in a space-saving manner, based on perimeter segments rather than outer perimeter boxes.

In a nutshell, Tomologic held that the claim requires forming of a cluster by means of free from nesting. On the contrary, Bystronic held that it could only be the parts themselves which have a free from shape, without any indication whatsoever of the envisaged nesting technique. It is our understanding that only according to Tomologic’s interpretation, the respective claim feature might potentially constitute a differentiating feature over so-called rectangular nesting. At this point of the hearing, the linguistic discussion about English grammar was quite intense. Bystronic explained the difference by way of a «baking dilemma», i.e. that «baking products with yeast» is not necessarily the same as «products baked with yeast»; the term «with» could not be construed as «by means of» at will.

We understood that the expert opinion had apparently held that the feature as claimed is not much of a limitation, and that it does in particular not exclude rectangular clustering; see e.g. ¶ [0052] of EP 864 in this respect:

Faszination Blech

It has been referred in the pleadings re (lack of) novelty to JP H09-285886 (D1, also available as EN translation) and a further document called «Rao» (likely Rao et al., Int J Adv Manuf Tenchnol (2007) 33: 436-448; available here). Further, it was referred to the publication «Faszination Blech» (you cannot make this up).

We conclude from the pleadings that the above issues had likely not been resolved by Tomologic’s auxiliary request(s) to maintain and assert EP 864 in amended / limited form. Rather, the auxiliary request(s) occasioned further issues re clarity and, maybe, enablement.

Interestingly, Bystronic had initially requested a declaratory judgement of non-infringement; see p 1-9 of the complaint as filed and the FPC’s letter of 16 January 2017:

by the FPC, indicating the case number (O2017_002) and the subject-matter of the complaint, i.e. request for declaratory judgement of non-infringement.

We conclude from the pleadings that the court might have (partially?) not considered this request for declaratory judgement, but this remains to be confirmed in the final judgement.

The pleadings further circled around Bystronic’s alleged contribution to the subject-matter of EP 864, as the basis for the requested assignment to co-ownership. Note that Bystronic had initially requested assignment to co-ownership for the whole patent family of EP 864, as well as the patent family of WO 2012/136262 A1.

The value in dispute was indicated as 2m CHF for the main claim and 1m CHF for the counterclaim. Actual costs incurred by the parties apparently by far exceed the refundable amounts according to the tariff.

The parties finally agreed to have settlement discussions.

Reported by Jolanda MINDER and Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2017_002 | Hearing of 5 February 2020

Bystronic Laser AG
./.
Tomologic AB

Panel of Judges:

    • Dr. Thomas LEGLER
    • Dr. Tobias BREMI
    • Christoph MÜLLER
    • Christophe SAAM
    • Dr. Rudolf RENTSCH

Judge-rapporteur:

    • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

    • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

    • Dr. Markus FRICK (Walder Wyss)
    • Manuel BIGLER (Walder Wyss)
    • Dr. Peter WALSER (Frei), assisting in patent matters
    • Dr. Markus MÜLLER (Frei), assisting in patent matters
    • Dr. Michael BERGER (Bystronic), assisting in patent matters

Former representative(s) of Plaintiff:

    • Catherine WEISSER
    • Paul ROSENICH (PPR), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant / Counterclaimant:

    • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
    • Martin TOLETI (Blum), assisting in patent matters
    • Dr. Christoph ENGELBRECHT (Blum), assisting in patent matters
    • Henrik HÄGGLÖF (Zacco), assisting in patent matters

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Be specific!

Reading time: 9 minutes

Case No. O2016_001 | Decision of 27 June 2019

We had reported about the main hearing in this matter on this Blog here.

Comadur logo

The patent in suit is CH 707 572 B1; see Swissreg for further bibliographic information. An automated translation can be found here. Harcane Sàrl had sued Comadur essentially to the effect that CH’572 be declared invalid (based on Art. 261(1) lit. a PatA, not lit. d); or, alternatively, if CH’572 was held valid, that it be transfered to Harcane Sàrl. On the other hand, Comadur finally defended CH’572 with the claims being limited. Further, Comadur requested that Harcane Sàrl’s complaint should be held inadmissible.

Parallel proceedings elsewhere

It is a procedural requirement that the case is not the subject of pending proceedings elsewhere or is not already the subject of a legally binding decision; Art. 59(2) lit. d and e CPC.

There had been co-pending proceedings in Neuchâtel where Comadur had sued Harcane Sàrl and sought for a delaratory judgment based on the Unfair Competition Act that it was the owner of certain manufacturing processes of ceramic injection molding (CIM) material. In turn, Harcane Sàrl saught a declaratory judgment in proceedings in Neuchâtel that Harcane Sàrl was the owner of the respective trade secrets relating to the CIM material.

Obviously, these requests differ from the requests in proceedings at the FPC. Thus, the case that has been brought before the FPC had not been the subject of pending proceedings elsewhere. Still, the FPC had stayed its proceedings on 28 May 2018 since certain preliminary questions overlapped with the cantonal proceedings. The stay was lifted on 13 February 2019, i.e. shortly after the Supreme Court had decided on both parties’ appeals against the decision of the Neuchâtel cantonal court; see 4A_584/2017, 4A_590/2017 of 9 January 2019.

The decision holds in ¶21 that the plaintiff well has a legitimate interest in bringing the present complaint since, according to the prior cantonal proceedings, Harcane Sàrl is only prohibited to use some very specific embodiments of the patent in suit. However, even the limited scope of CH’572 goes far beyond that.

limitation of the patent

The defendant / patentee partially surrendered CH’572 in accordance with Art. 24(1) lit. c PatA and declared the same to the FPC; see O2012_030, ¶17.

Claim 1 as amended reads as follows:


Claim 1 as amended

Liant pour composition de moulage par injection comprenant :

    • de 35 à 54% vol. d’une base polymérique
    • de 40 à 55% vol. d’un mélange de cires,
    • et environ 10% vol. d’un surfactant,

dans lequel la base polymérique contient des copolymères d’éthylène et d’acide méthacrylique ou acrylique, ou des copolymères d’éthylène et d’acétate de vinyle, ou des copolymères d’éthylène comprenant un anhydride maléique ou un mélange de ces copolymères, ainsi que du polyéthylène, du polypropylène et une résine acrylique, et dans lequel lesdits copolymères sont des copolymères d’éthylène et d’acide méthacrylique ou acrylique, ou des copolymères d’éthylène comprenant un anhydride maléique ou un mélange de ces copolymères;

à l’exclusion d’un liant pour composition de moulage par injection
comprenant de 35 à 50% vol d’une base polymérique, de 40 à 55 %
vol d’un mélange de cires, et environ 10% vol d’un surfactant, dans
lequel la base polymérique contient des copolymères d’éthylène et
d’acide méthacrylique ou acrylique, ou des copolymères d’éthylène
et d’acétate de vinyle, ou des copolymères d’éthylène comprenant
un anhydride maléique ou un mélange de ces copolymères, ainsi
que du polyéthylène, du polypropylène et une résine acrylique.


The underlined / italic part of the claim is a so-called undisclosed disclaimer to exclude the subject-matter of CH 708 097 A2, a prior right that had been filed earlier but published only after the filing date of CH’572. As much as I recall, this is the first time that such an undisclosed disclaimer has been at stake and allowed in proceedings at the FPC. Note, however, that O2012_030 in ¶20.1 already suggested that the FPC would follow the EPO’s precedent G 1/03.

Dependent claims 2-6 remain unchanged. Claims 7-10 have been deleted.

novelty and inventive step

The plaintiff alleged that CH’572 was not novel over US 5,266,264, several PhD theses (Juan M. Adames, 2007; S. Kowalski, 2005; C. Quinard, 2008) and a prior use, i.e. the sale of a certain feedstock to Comadur.

Apparently, the court did not appreciate how the novelty attacks had been presented. The decision holds that, according to common practice, a specific analysis of the features of the claim and a specific reference to the prior art has to be made, for each of the features. It is not the court’s task to establish the facts of its own motion and to seek the information in the references filed as exhibits. On the contrary, the relevant facts must be alleged by providing specific information, in particular by reference to a page or line number, while specifying which feature of the claim is there to be found (see ¶¶28-30).

Le Tribunal n’est pas chargé d’établir les faits d’office et il ne lui incombe pas de rechercher lui-même les informations dans les documents de l’art antérieur déposés en tant que pièce jointe. En particulier, une référence globale à un document dans le sens de «l’objet de la revendication 1 est divulgué dans le document X» ne suffit pas pour satisfaire au fardeau de l’allégation. Il faut au contraire alléguer les faits pertinents en fournissant des indications spécifiques, notamment par renvoi à un numéro de page, de ligne, tout en précisant quelle caractéristique de la revendication se retrouve dans le document de l’état de la technique invoqué.

In the absence of any specific allegations, the FPC did not consider the novelty attacks to the extent they were based on prior art documents. What remained was the sale of a certain feedstock to Comadur. However, the decision holds that these sales were governed by an NDA and thus cannot be considered at all. Further sales to third parties had been alleged but remained essentially unsubstantiated.

Accordingly, novelty was acknowledged.

The FPC did not appreciate the way the obviousness attacks had been presented, either. The decision holds that the FPC cannot complete an incomplete factual allegations of the parties. This is in contrast to proceedings at the EPO which shall examine the facts of its own motion and which shall not be restricted in this examination to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties and the relief sought; Art. 114(1) EPC. Determining whether an invention is based on an inventive step is a question of law. However, the general technical knowledge of the skilled person, the closest prior art, the differentiating features, etc. are facts, and it is up to the parties to allege these facts (see ¶37).

In my perception, the considerations with respect to the burden / degree of substantiation are what this decision will likely be cited for in the future.

To the extent the FPC admitted the plaintiff’s arguments and evidence into the proceedings at all, the decision holds that the claimed subject-matter was not obvious over US 5,266,264.

Costs

Even though the plaintiff did not succeed with any request, the defendant was still charged with half of the court fee since the patent was maintained only to a limited extent, i.e. the defendant partially acknowledged the plaintiff’s complaint and both parties win and therefore lose equally.

No compensation for legal represenatation was awarded.

Interestingly, the plaintiff only involved a patent attorney when the expert opinion of the judge-rapporteur had been established. The respective expenses were not considered necessary anymore since the closure of the file had already occured at that time. On the other hand, defendant’s expenses for the assisting patent attorney of ICB, a company within the Swatch group of companies, had not been considered, either: No intra-group expenses are reimbursed; see O2014_009, ¶6.2.

UPDATE 9 September 2019:

The decision has been appealed to the Supreme Court.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2016_001 | Decision of 27 June 2019

Harcane Sàrl
./.
Comadur SA

Panel of Judges:

    • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER
    • Dr. Tobias BREMI
    • Dr. Michael STÖRZBBACH
    • Dr. Regula RÜEDI
    • Dr. Thomas LEGLER

Judge-rapporteur:

    • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

    • Agnieszka TABERSKA

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

    • Jean-Claude SCHWEIZER (SLB)

Representative(s) of Defendant:

    • Dr. Nathalie TISSOT (Tissot)
    • Marie TISSOT (Tissot)
    • Thierry RAVENEL (ICB), assisting in patent matters

DECISION OF THE FPC
→ patent maintained / partially surrendered; plaintiff’s claims dismissed
Case no.: O2016_001
Decision of: 27 June 2019
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DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
→ referred to in ¶13 of the FPC decision
Case nos.: 4A_584/2017
4A_590/2017
Decision of: 9 January 2019
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Register ban ordered, but only after hearing the defendants

Reading time: 4 minutes

Case No. S2019_003 | Decision of 6 February 2019
Case No. S2019_003 | Decision of 11 July 2019

These two decisions in summary proceedings are heavily redacted — which is an exception to the rule. Obviously, the overall conflict between the parties also involves some criminal allegations against a natural person (Art. 146 CC; fraud).

In view of the criminal allegations I am not going to engage in any de-anonymisation exercise here; and this post is not open for comments, either.
Canton of Fribourg

A register ban for six Swiss patent applications had been issued by the public prosecutor of the Canton of Fribourg on 22 May 2017, in view of the criminal charge. The public prosecutor informed the plainfiff on 21 November 2018 of the deadline for finally lodging civil proceedings, i.e. 31 January 2019, and indicated that sequestration of the six patent applications would be lifted at that date (however, this apparently had not happened).

The plaintiff indeed initiated civil proceedings, but only on the very last day of the time limit,  and only in summary proceedings. In particular, issuance of a register ban had been requested without hearing the defendant beforehand.

While the President acting as single judge appreciated the risk that the six patent applications might be transferred to defendant (3) in view of some prior conduct of the defendant(s), and even though particular urgency was acknowledged, he did not order a register ban ex parte. The President held that the urgency is exclusively due to the late submission of the request by the plaintiff who should have taken action swiftly after the public prosecutor’s notification of 21 November 2108. If the plaintiff had filed the request in a timely manner, i.e. in early December 2018, the defendants would have had sufficient time to take a position on the request. The President held that the defendants cannot be deprived of their constitutional right to be heard because of the plaintiff’s belated action. The decision refers in passing to S2018_002, ¶7, for that a delay of two months results in the rejection of the request in any event.

The request for issuance of interim measures without hearing the defendant beforehand was thus denied with decision of 6 February 2019.

However, the register ban had still been issued with decision of 11 July 2019. In balancing the potential disadvantages suffered by the plaintiff and the defendants, the President (again acting as single judge) concluded that there was a much greater potential damage that the plaintiff would suffer if the register ban would not be issued, compared with the defendants potential damage if the register ban was granted. Nevertheless, the decision clearly notes that it is highly doubtful that the six patent applications had been contractually assigned to the plaintiff. Still, the fact that defendants (1) and (2) had previously attempted to assign the patent application to defendant (3), which is a mailbox company in Luxembourg, played out to the plaintiffs advantage, for the time being.

UPDATE 22 August 2019:

The decision of 11 July 2019 has not been appealed / is now final.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. S2019_003 | Decision of 6 February 2019
Case No. S2019_003 | Decision of 11 July 2019

A. Sàrl
./.
(1) B.
(2) C.
(3) D. S.A.

Single judge:

  • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of A.:

  • Stefano FABBRO (FLD)

Representative(s) of B.:

FIRST DECISION OF THE FPC
→ register ban denied without hearing the defendant
Case no.: S2019_003
Decision of: 6 February 2019
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SECOND DECISION OF THE FPC
→ register ban granted after hearing the defendant
Case no.: S2019_003
Decision of: 11 July 2019
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The heat is on between Laurastar and Innosteam

Case No. O2018_016 | Hearing of 25 June 2019

Reading time: 7 minutes
Laurastar logo

Laurastar and Innosteam are litigating about ownership of two PCT applications, WO 2018/006994 A1 and WO 2018/036653 A1; see the EPO Register here and here. The patent applications are about devices and methods for producing instant steam (WO’994) and instant hot water (WO’653), for use e.g. in devices for ironing.

Innosteam logo

Briefly, plaintiff alleges that the subject matter of both PCT applications had been invented by the inventors in fulfillment of their contractual duties while they were employees of Laurastar.

We have reported on this Blog here about the provisional register ban that had been issued without hearing the defendant beforehand, and the subsequent hearing. The register ban had finally been maintained in summary proceedings S2018_003; see this Blog here.

Note that both PCT applications have meanwhile been nationalized inter alia at the EPO, but the EPO has stayed its proceedings on request of Laurastar SA pursuant to R. 14(1) EPC while main proceedings at the FPC are pending; see here (re WO’693) and here (re WO’994). It is still (too) early to obtain full and complete information about the status of nationalization elsewhere in the world, but WIPO’s PatentScope indicates further nationalizations in the Ukraine and the Russian Federation; see here (re WO’653) and here (re WO’994). Anyway, we could now catch a glimpse of what is going on in main proceedings O2018_016 at the hearing on June 25, 2019 in Neuchâtel. The hearing was held in French language — well, at least the most of it.

Plaintiff’s pleadings emphasized that the invention was conceived before the inventors left Laurastar SA to work for Innosteam Swiss SA. A significant part of the argument evolved around a document created by Mr. Pasche that allegedly shows all the features of the patent applications in question (hereinafter refered to as ‘Pasche’):

The document created by M. Pasche while employed by the plaintiff

But even if there were any potential differences between Pasche and the two patent applications, they were only of minor importance and could not render the claimed subject-matter inventive. And, in the plaintiff’s view, this has to be taken into account; else, one could just steal an invention, add an insignificant feature to it and be unassailable.

Plaintiff further questioned to what extent a detailed claim analysis, as apparently done by the judge rapporteur, was appropriate. In the plaintiff’s view, the claims are still subject to change and do not necessarily represent the invention as a whole. For this reason, according to the plaintiff, the judge rapporteur should have analyzed the description as well. In addition, plaintiff argued that the inventiveness of the subject matter over Pasche should have been analyzed as well.

Defendant, by contrast, argued that the subject-matter outlined in Pasche was free state of the art, in any event. Thus, even if it showed all the features of the patent applications in question, just for the sake of argument, it could not be proprietary to Laurastar SA or anybody else. This led to some discussion about the term ‘invention’: Does it imply non-obviousness over the prior art, i.e. an inventive step? It has been argued that under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 332), an invention does not require an inventive step (emphasis added):

Inventions and designs produced by the employee alone or in collaboration with others in the course of his work for the employer and in performance of his contractual obligations belong to the employer, whether or not they may be protected.

A decision on these issues might be an interesting read — if the parties haven’t settled.

On the procedural side, the hearing was quite illustrative of Switzerland:

Defendant’s representative started his pleadings with reference to the federalism in Switzerland and explained that he was going to structure his pleadings according to what is customary in Geneva. This may have contributed to some confusion that arose after a (brief) first part of defendant’s pleadings. Defendant’s representative sat back down, and the President asked if he was done, which the representative affirmed. The president then firmly told the parties that the time to make arguments was now:

Le temps de répondre, c’est maintenant!

This prompted defendant’s councel to get back up again and finish his pleadings. The assisting patent attorney then added his share to the pleadings — in German language. This was apparently not appreciated by everybody in the room, and the opposing patent attorney could not help himself but leave a snarky remark about this in his own pleadings later.

I wonder whether I should better immediately refresh my French and learn some Italian, just to be prepared for some spontaneous pleadings in a language that hasn’t been announced beforehand(?).  (Just kidding) /MW
Where do we go now?

At the end of the hearing, the President asked whether the parties were interested in settlement talks. Both parties gave answers along the same lines, saying that in principle they would of course be interested in a settlement. However, neither party found it realistic to find a mutually agreeable compromise since a joint assignment of the patent applications was not desirable to either party. Thus, according to both parties, settlement negotiations were pointless.

OMG

The President buried the face in his hands and, after a sigh, explained to the parties in German (‘Erlauben Sie mir, das auf Deutsch zu sagen’) that it was conceivable that a judgment could give exactly that result: Joint ownership. Such a forced marriage may not facilitate things for either party and the President gently reminded both parties that a settlement may well be the better course of action.

A three-legged race is a tricky exercise. It may work, but one may also stumble miserably.

The parties asked for a short break to discuss the President’s comment, after which it was discussed non-publicly whether the parties may be willing to settle after all.

Reported by Philippe KNÜSEL and Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2018_016 | Hearing of 25 June 2019

Laurastar SA
./.
Innosteam Swiss SA

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER
  • Dr. Ralph SCHLOSSER
  • Dr. Giovanni GERVASIO

Judge-rapporteur:

  • Dr. Giovanni GERVASIO

Court Clerk:

  • Agnieszka TABERSKA

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

  • Dominique GUEX (Bourgeois)
  • André ROLAND (Roland), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant:

ANNOUNCEMENT

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WO 2018/006994 A1

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WO 2018/036653 A1

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Writing instrument: The Supreme Court’s final stroke

Case Nos. 4A_435/2018, 4A_441/2018 (Supreme Court) | Decision of 29 January 2019 on appeal against O2015_018 (FPC) | Decision of 15 June 2018 | ‘Instrument d’écriture’

Please see this Blog here for a detailed review of the underlying decision of the FPC in this matter.

Both parties had lodged an appeal — but the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals. While the FPC’s judgement was quite a booklet of 50+ pages, it took the Supreme Court only 7 pages to deal with both appeals. Most of the judgment indeed is pretty straight forward. Still, the judgment has quite some interesting aspects, in my perception:

  1. Assignment of a patent does not imply assignment of the universal right to the invention per se 
Montres Valgine logo

Guenat had requested that Swiss Finest‘s Swiss patent be annulled based on Art. 26(1) lit. d PatA, i.e. for lack of entitlement. However, such request can only be brought by the entitled person; Art. 28 PatA. Guenat alleged that Frédéric Garinaud transferred ‘full and complete ownership’ of the European patent application to Guenat. But that did not help. Frédéric Garinaud specifically assigned the European patent application to Guenat, but not the universal rights in the ‘invention’ itself. Guenat’s request for declaration of nullity based on Art. 26(1) lit. d PatA was thus held inadmissible for lack of standing.

On appeal, Guenat criticises the FPC’s ‘artificial dichotomy’ between the invention and the related patent application, and claims complete control over the invention in dispute. The Supreme Court didn’t buy into that. The decision holds in ¶3.2 that Guenat’s argument is based on an assumption about the parties’ intention in respect of the transfer agreement of April 2013. This is not a question of law, but of fact. But the FPC had not found that the real and common intention the parties had been to assign all intellectual property rights to the invention and the right to be granted all related patents. On the contrary, according to the FPC, the agreement in question ‘clearly refers only to the European patent application and the resulting European patent, and not to the invention as such’ — which finding is binding on the Supreme Court since it is not ‘arbitrary.’

Thus, the Supreme Court apparently had no doubt that the assignment of a specific patent does not necessarily imply the assignment of the universal rights in the invention itself.

  1. Assessment of inventive step is a question of law, but …

Guenat argued on appeal that the FPC had violated the principle of party disposition because it took facts into account that had not been alleged by the defendant.

Now, what had happened?

The FPC had held that a specific feature (C3-1) was not disclosed in the closest prior art document. Guenat had a different understanding of the specific feature, and had argued that based on a ‘correct’ understanding of the feature it had well been disclosed in the closest prior art.

Swiss Finest logo

On appeal, Guenat argued that Swiss Finest had not even alleged that feature C3-1 was not disclosed in that document. Unfortunately, it is not readily clear from the decision to which version of feature C3-1 that allegation pertained: The feature as construed by the Guenat, or the feature as construed by the FPC?

The Supreme Court held that it had not been disputed that all the factual elements necessary for the analysis of obviousness had been brought on file by the parties. Further, the Supreme Court held that Guenat had not asserted that the FPC had to supplement the facts on its own, and that such conduct was also not apparent from the file. In the Supreme Court’s view, the FPC was thus in a position to assess obviousness, which is a question of law. It is irrelevant in this respect that the presence or absence of specific features in the prior art and/or the patent have been alleged by the defendant or the plaintiff. On the basis of the facts gathered by the parties in order to consider a question of law, the court did not violate the principle of party disposition.

Without any in-depth knowledge of what had or had not been argued by the parties, I just cannot say whether I would agree with the assessment on the merits of the case. But the Supreme Court’s general considerations on questions of law vs. questions of fact trigger some further thoughts.

Clearly, assessment of obviousness is a question of law — but the underlying factual elements still need to be asserted by the parties. But what are the ‘factual elements’? They must be something more specific than just ‘the patent in suit’, ‘D1’ or the like. Else, a court could just combine whatever is on file in its assessment of obviousness, fully detached from the pleadings. This cannot be it. Now, let’s assume that both parties come up with a somewhat strange claim construction, and base all their obviousness attacks / defenses on a wrongly construed claim. In my understanding, claim construction clearly is a question of law, too (see e.g. X ZR 255/01 – ‘Bodenseitige Vereinzelungseinrichtung’ of the German Federal Supreme Court in ¶5, with further reference). But what if no party ever pointed to the relevant underlying ‘factual elements’ (i.e. specific sections of the patent in suit) that support the ‘correct’ claim construction? May the court then even come up with a different / the ‘correct’ claim construction at all?

UPDATE 21 March 2019:

Note that the FPC had held in the recent decision S2018_006 that claim construction is a question of law. In that case, both parties had not construed the feature in question at all, and the FPC came up with a construction on its own:

Wie der Begriff korrekt auszulegen ist, tragen die Beklagten hingegen ebenso wenig wie die Klägerin vor. Da die Auslegung des Patentanspruchs eine Rechtsfrage ist,15 geht die Annahme der Beklagten fehl, das Gericht dürfe den Anspruch mangels entsprechenden Vortrags der Klägerin nicht so auslegen, dass er auch etwas anderes als einen Schneidprozess erfasst.
15 Federal Supreme Court: 4A_142/2011, ¶1.3
But, again, what if both parties came up with a claim construction mutually agreed upon — but which, in the courts view, is just wrong? Or, what if both parties come up with different constructions which are both wrong in the court’s view? Can the court then correct such (a) construction(s) if it would have to rely on ‘factual elements’ that have never been pointed at by the parties, just because it is a question of law? And if that was the case, then where is the limit in the assessment of obviousness — which is a question of law, too?

The theory of separating questions of law from questions of fact is simple. But life is complicated …

On a sidenote: Wouldn’t it be good to establish common ground on what the claim actually is all about before diving any deeper? This is what a Markman hearing in the U.S. is all about. Even though I am not overly enthusiastic about quite some aspects of patent litigation in the U.S., this one certainly is useful.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. 4A_435/2018 (Supreme Court) | Decision of 29 January 2019 on appeal against O2015_018 (FPC) | Decision of 15 June 2018 | ‘Instrument d’écriture’

Guenat SA Montres Valgine (appellant)
./.
Swiss Finest SA (respondent)

and

Case No. 4A_441/2018 (Supreme Court) | Decision of 29 January 2019 on appeal against O2015_018 (FPC) | Decision of 15 June 2018 | ‘Instrument d’écriture’

Swiss Finest SA (appellant)
./.
Guenat SA Montres Valgine (respondent)
Both proceedings were jointly dealt with by the Supreme Court.

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Christina KISS
    • Dr. Kathrin KLETT
    • Dr. Fabienne HOHL

Court Clerk:

  •  Nicolas CURCHOD

Representative(s) of Guenat SA Montres Valgine:

Representative(s) of Swiss Finest SA:

  • Christoph KÜNZI (CBK)

SUPREME COURT
on appeal against O2015_018 (FPC) | Decision of 15 June 2018
Case nos.: 4A_435/2018
4A_441/2018
Decision of: 29 January 2019
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PATENT COURT
Case no.: O2015_018
Decision of: 15 June 2018

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CH 704 790 B1

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CH 704 790 C1

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EP 2 497 648 B1

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