Note that Hepp Wenger Ryffel is involved in this matter on behalf of the plaintiff.
Pemetrexed revisited, once again:
As reported earlier on this Blog here, the Supreme Court had remitted the case to the FPC with the order to dismiss the suit with respect to the requested declaratory judgment of non-infringement for the diacid, and to also assess the two other salts that had initially been at stake in first instance proceedings.
Well, the first part is a no-brainer. The FPC is bound to the legal assessment of the Supreme Court, and it thus dismissed the suit with respect to the diacid.
As to the two other salts, i.e. pemetrexed dipotassium and pemetrexed ditromethamine, the FPC briefly assessed infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
The first question to be answered in the assessment of infringement under the DoE is whether the replaced feature and the replacing feature have the same objective function. The decision holds that it is only the cation that is different, and that the dianion is the same in any event. Further, it is held that both the dipotassium and the ditromethamine salt will be dissociated under physiological conditions, and everything suggests that the mode of action is determined by the dianion.
Pemetrexeddikalium unterscheidet sich von Pemetrexeddinatrium bzw. Pemetrexeddisäure lediglich durch das Kation. Das Dianion ist in allen Fällen identisch. Pemetrexeddikalium liegt bei physiologischem pH dissoziiert in Kation und Dianion vor. Es spricht alles dafür, dass die Wirkungsweise durch das Pemetrexed-Dianion gegeben ist.
Aus diesen Gründen ist eine Gleichwirkung für Pemetrexeddikalium gegeben ist.
One may like or dislike the outcome as it is. Be this as it may. What is troubling me is that this reasoning is only focused on the mode of action of the dianion. Note that the dianion neither is the replaced feature nor the replacing feature. Does this reasoning actually address the first question of the FPC’s questionnaire for the assessment under the DoE at all?
Does the replacing feature objectively fulfil the same function? (‘Gleichwirkung’)
Is there a need to rephrase the first question? Time will show, I guess.
The FPC answered the second and third question in the affirmative, too. It did so by mere reference to the considerations of the Supreme Court.
In sum, all three pemetrexed forms (diacid, dipotassium and ditromethamine) are held to infringe the patent in suit.
In a nutshell, the FPC had taken a stepwise approach in O2015_004. In first place, it was held that limitation from antifolate to pemetrexed disodium during prosecution constitutes an abandonment of subject-matter. In an auxiliary assessment, i.e. if one were to consider the limitation not as an abandonment, the FPC denied an infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents (DoE) since the skilled person would have understood the wording pemetrexed disodium as a strict limitation, in view of the claims and in further consideration of the specification.
As you were! The Supreme Court did not agree with either of these two findings.
1. Abandonment of subject-matter
The wording of the claims had been narrowed down during prosecution: The broad term antifolate had been amended in the claims to pemtrexed in first place and finally to pemetrexed disodium, to restore novelty while at the same time complying with Art. 123(2) EPC.
This limitation is also reflected in the description. The definition in paragraph  of EP’508 had only been introduced during prosecution:
The FPC had held that the patentee is bound by the limitation that he had accepted during prosecution in order to obtain the patent, and that he is therefore prevented under principles of good faith (Art. 2 CC) to now circumvent this limitation by asserting equivalence as if the limitation had not been made.
The Supreme Court notes that behavior in contradiction to one’s prior acts is not generally prohibited under the principle of good faith, but only if the prior act gave rise to a legitimate trust of others which then is frustrated by the later act (BGE 125 III 257, r. 2a). The Supreme Court further holds that the limitation of a claim feature does not readily constitute an abandonment of the protection against infringement under the DoE for that feature without taking the reasons of the limitation into account.
Die Einschränkung eines Merkmals stellt nicht ohne weiteres und unbesehen des Grundes für diese Einschränkung eine Erklärung des Verzichts auf den Schutz gegen Nachahmung dar.
The Supreme Court did not identify any special circumstances that would justify the use of the makeshift of Art. 2 CC to prevent gross injustice, either.
2. Infringement under the DoE
The Supreme Court held that the pemetrexed anion is the active substance with anti-cancer effect and agreed with the FPC’s finding that the diacid and the disodium salt objectively fulfil the same function.
The second question (accessibility / ‘Auffindbarkeit’) is somewhat tricky, again. The Supreme Court recites the FPC in that accessibility of the replacing feature had been answered in the affirmative; ¶5.4.
Die Vorinstanz hat die Auffindbarkeit der abgewandelten Form für den Fachmann bejaht.
This is not very precise. The second question, in the FPC’s approach, asks for the accessibility of the same effect when the skilled person is confronted with both the claimed variant and the replacing variant. The FPC’s second question is not about how to get to the replacing variant; it’s already there.
Anyway, the Supreme Court held that the skilled person had a reasonable expectation that the replacing variant would work. The necessity of some routine experiments to confirm this expectiation is of no avail. Accessibility was thus confirmed, too.
The Supreme Court also answered the third question (same value / ‘Gleichwertigkeit’) in the affirmative. The skilled person had no reason to believe that the patentee had only intended protection for the literal meaning of the claim, i.e. pemetrexed disodium.
Der Fachmann […] hatte keinen Grund zur Annahme, die Patentinhaberin habe Schutz nur für die wortsinngemässe Ausführung beansprucht.
Even though it is noted in paragraph  of the patent (see marked-up excerpt above) that
[t]he ‘antifolate’ or ‘antifolate drug’ for use in this invention is Pemetrexed disodium (ALIMTA®), as manufactured by Eli Lilly & Co.
the Supreme Court held that there is no apparent reason why the patent would expand on the properties and ways of action of antifolates in general if it was intended to limit the claimed scope to the product manufacted by the patentee; ¶5.5.6.
Wenn zudem in der Beschreibung erklärt wird, das für die Erfindung verwendete Antifolat sei das von der Patentinhaberin hergestellte Pemetrexed-Dinatrium der Marke ‘Alimta’, so ergibt sich daraus bei objektiver Betrachtung eine Beschränkung ausschliesslich auf dieses Antifolat im Gesamtzusammenhang der Beschreibung nicht. Denn es ist nicht erkennbar, weshalb im Patent die Eigenschaften und die Wirkungsweise von Antifolaten allgemein beschrieben werden sollte, wenn das von der Erfindung beanspruchte tumorhemmende Produkt ausschliesslich das von der Patentinhaberin hergestellte Markenprodukt sein sollte.
Concluding, the Supreme Court held that use of pemetrexed diacid instead of pemetrexed disodium infringes the patent under the DoE.
The case has been remitted to the FPC with the order to dismiss the suit with respect to the requested declaratory judgment of non-infringement for the diacid, and to also assess the two other salts that had initially been at stake in first instance proceedings.
Reported by Martin WILMING
For ease of reference, here is a list of some corresponding decisions of highest instance available elsewhere, based on the same European patent:
I will update the list when more decisions are available.
Lawyers and patent attorneys are having a hard time nowadays when advising clients on infringment under the DoE.
Maybe it should not be me to overly analyse this decision since my firm has been involved in this matter, as noted above. But I was taken aback by some key elements of the decision which are of relevance far beyond the subject-matter at stake in the present matter, and I will briefly address those aspects on a general level only, to the extent possible.
So, here is some food for further thought:
i) The gist of the DoE?
The Supreme Court comes up with a very pronounced gist of the DoE; see ¶5.5.3:
Der Schutzbereich wird – mit Ausnahme der nachfolgend zu erörternden bewusst gewählten Beschränkung – über die genaue wörtliche Anwendung der Patentansprüche hinaus gewährt in der Erkenntnis, dass es auch bei sorgfältiger und umsichtiger Redaktion unmöglich ist, in einer technischen Anleitung alle möglichen Ausführungen zu benennen. Der Schutz soll daher auch gewährt werden, wenn die technische Anleitung den Fachmann über den zu engen Wortsinn hinaus anweist, wie die Erfindung zu verwirklichen ist.
This can be loosely translated as follows:
With the exception of a deliberately chosen limitation the scope of protection shall extend beyond the literal meaning, in appreciation of the fact that it is not possible to specify all potential embodiments even when the text is redacted with all due care and diligence. Protection shall thus also be granted when the technical teaching instructs the skilled person how to work the invention beyond the overly limited literal meaning.
I do not agree.
This rationale would actually excuse each and every mishap in drafting / prosecution of an application, be it a minor negligence, a gross error or just blatant foolery. All of this could not reasonably be considered deliberately chosen (‘bewusst gewählt’) and would thus not be covered by the exception.
Now, as long as the skilled person nevertheless understands that the teaching of the patent is applicable beyond the literal meaning, it shall still be covered by the scope of the claim under the DoE?
Is this the right balance between legal certainty for the public and forgiveness of drafting / prosecution failures?
The Protocol on Interpretation of Art. 69 is not that strict. It only requires that due account shall be taken of any element which is equivalent to an element specified in the claims when determining the scope of protection. Does ‘due account’ really mean that the only exception is an express and deliberatly chosen limitation?
I am in doubt.
One of the best pieces on the various situations where the DoE is typically invoked that I have come across still is in Arnold J’s judgment at the High Court of Justice in the corresponding matter in the U.K.,  EWHC 1511 (Pat), in ¶104 ff.:
[E]xperience shows that patentees resort to arguments about equivalents in three main classes of case. The first is where, with the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that the patent was unfortunately drafted, whether because of poor instructions from the inventor or poor drafting by his patent attorney or a combination of these things. […] The second class is where technology has moved on since the priority or filing date of the patent. […] The third class is where the patentee now regrets a decision taken during the course of prosecution of the patent application, whether by himself or by the examiner, and is trying to avoid the consequences of that decision.
Arnold J went on in his assessment of the first and the third class of cases in ¶105 and ¶107, respectively:
In the first class of case, the law recognises that drafting patent claims is a difficult and imprecise art and that third parties should not be allowed to exploit infelicities of drafting where it is reasonably clear that those infelicities should not affect the scope of the claim. This is in order to provide ‘fair protection for the patent proprietor’. The law also recognises, however, the countervailing consideration that third parties are entitled to rely on the drafting of the claim when deciding on a commercial course of action. There is no tort of avoiding a patent claim. Thus it is also necessary to provide ‘a reasonable degree of legal certainty for third parties’. The problem, of course, is that what is fair protection to one person is legal uncertainty to another. Conversely, what is reasonable legal certainty to the second person is a denial of protection to the first. The courts have to strike a balance. […]
In the third class of case, there is no reason why the law should be sympathetic to the patentee. Not only do applicants generally rely on skilled professional advice, but also they can appeal against adverse decisions of examiners during the course of prosecution if they consider that those decisions are wrong. If the courts allow decisions as to claim scope made by the examiner during the course of prosecution which have not been successfully appealed effectively to be overturned by decisions on claim construction, the courts undermine the important role of the examiner. This is still more so if the courts allow decisions as to claim scope made by the applicant during the course of prosecution effectively to be reversed by decisions on claim construction.
ii) The more apparent the replacing feature (but not too much, please!), the more likely the third question would be answered in the affirmative?
There has been a guiding principle in the assessment of equivalents according to the German Federal Supreme Court since the ‘Okklusionsvorrichtung‘ decision (X ZR 16/09):
If the description discloses several possibilities regarding how a specific technical effect can be attained but only one possibility has been included in the patent claim, the use of the other possibilities generally does not constitute an infringement under the doctrine of equivalence.
So, an explicit mentioning of two alternatives in the specification while only one of these alternatives is recited in the claim rules out an infringement under the DoE. Fine.
But what if there is explicit disclosure of a generic class of compounds (‘antifolate’) and only a single specific variant (‘pemetrexed disodium’) in the claims and specification? Luckily, the German Federal Supreme Court had to assess the parallel case in Germany, too (X ZR 29/15): It concluded that this is not sufficient per se. But if there were further indications that the skilled person reads the other variants along in his head (‘unmittelbar mitlesen’), then ‘Okklusionvorrichtung’ might well be applicable. Fine, too.
Now, this is the chemist in me speaking to the other chemists out there: Imagine you readily appreciate the below as a preferred embodiment of a group of compounds (¶5.5.7), can you avoid reading along in your head some very close relatives of this compound?
The chemist in me has a hard time to not think of some close relatives in the upper right of the molecule.
Safeguarding legal certainty for the public has always been an issue. The following is taken from Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co. of ancient 1881:
[I]t must be remembered that the claim of a specific device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed. It is a declaration that that which is not claimed is either not the patentee’s invention, or, if his, he dedicates it to the public.
In my perception, this still holds true nowadays; equivalence must not extend to what is apparent on the face of the patent, but remained unclaimed.
I have been a strong believer in the power of the questionnaires. But, frankly, I am getting more and more frustrated. When cases come up where the result based on just two questions appears to be inappropriate, a third one is added (Germany and Switzerland). If the result with three questions appears to be inappropriate, the questions are amended (UK). Still, judgments on equivalence are frequently reversed even in one and the same jurisdiction, and are rarely consistent across jurisdictions. So, what is it all worth? The questionnaires apparently only provide an illusion of certainty, don’t they? And they are not the law. (If you catch me red-handed when using the questionnaire nevertheless, don’t blame me for this paragraph. I am just conforming with the landmark case law …)
iii) What about inventive equivalents?
The Supreme Court elaborates on the second criterion (accessibility / ‘Auffindbarkeit’) in the assessment of equivalents in ¶5.4 ff. It is held in ¶5.4.1:
Der Fachmann […] muss aufgrund seines Allgemeinwissens durch die patentierte Erfindung zur Abwandlung angeregt werden; beruht die Abwandlung ihrerseits auf erfinderischer Tätigkeit, ist die Auffindbarkeit ausgeschlossen (vgl. BGE 125 III 29 E. 3b S. 32 mit Verweisen).
Loosely translated as follows:
The skilled person must be prompted to the replaced feature by his common general knowledge and based on the patented invention; accessibility is ruled out if the replacing feature itself is based on an inventive step ([…]).
The decision suggests in ¶5.4.1 that this is common ground for the Supreme Courts of the UK, Germany and Switzerland.
The second test applied by the German courts, as I understand it, at least sometimes appears to require the variation not to be inventive, but I am not sure that that is an appropriate requirement, although it is unnecessary to decide that point on this appeal. If the variation represents an inventive step, while it may render it less likely that the patentee will succeed on the second reformulated question, I find it hard to see why that alone should prevent the resultant variant from infringing the original invention. It may entitle the infringer to a new patent, in the same way as the invention of a novel use for a patented invention can itself be patented, but like such a novel use I see no reason why the variant should not infringe the original patent.
I am not even sure if this holds true for Switzerland. The Supreme Court’s own landmark ruling ‘Urinalventil’ (4A_131/2016) marches to a different drummer, in my perception. In that later case, the replacing feature in the attacked embodiment was in fact patented by the EPO, with the patent in suit being explicitly acknowledged as closest prior art. The attacked embodiment had nevertheless been held to infringe the patent in suit under the DoE. See this Blog here for a detailed review of the ‘Urinalventil’ case.
Moreover, the second question in the FPC’s questionnaire in no way excludes inventive equivalents; see this Blog here. The headnote in O2014_002 reads as follows:
The assessment of accessibility is not to be confused with the assessment of inventiveness. Starting point for the assessment of accessibility is not the general state of the art, but the patent in suit. Therefore it is not to be assessed whether the replaced feature is inventive in view of the state of the art. It is rather to be assessed whether, starting from the teaching of the patent in suit, it is evident for the skilled person that the replaced feature has the same effect (r. 126.96.36.199).
(Clarification of the case law with respect to S2013_001, decision dated 21. März 2013)
iv) Should one care (more) about the title?
There are multiple references to the title of the patent in particular in the reasons of the Supreme Court’s decision (p. 2, section A; ¶5.5.5; ¶5.5.6:
[…] Patent[s] […] dessen Gegenstand umschrieben ist als “Combination containing an antifolate and methylmalonic acid lowering agent” […];
In der Beschreibung ist – wie im Titel des Patents – allgemein von Antifolaten die Rede.
This emphasis on the title puzzles me. It is required by the EPC that the title of the invention must be contained in the request for grant form and that it shall clearly and concisely state the technical designation of the invention (R. 41(2) lit. b EPC), no doubt about it. However, the title is not part of the description (R. 42 EPC) which shall be used to interpret the claims (Art. 69(1) EPC) in accordance with the Protocol on Interpretation of Art. 69.
I am not aware of any relevant decision on equivalents that has put this much emphasis on the title.On a personal note, I couldn’t have cared less about the title by now. A negligence?
v) Final thoughts
There were times (in particular in Germany after introduction of the third criterion (‘Gleichwertigkeit’)) when the DoE effectively was dead. In my perception, the pendulum now swings back and we see decisions more to the contrary. Over time, the ‘truth’ will be somewhere in between. Hopefully.
Exhausted from equivalents, I remain
If you came here on a shortcut, you missed a lot. Anyway, I will assume this was your ‘delibarately chosen limitation’ of information. The decision holds:
Limitation of ‘antifolate’ to ‘pemetrexed disodium’ during prosecution did not constitute an abandonment of subject-matter.
A composition comprising pemetrexed diacid infringes a claim specifying pemetrexed disodium under the DoE.
The case is remitted to the FPC to with the order to dismiss the suit with respect to the requested declaratory judgment of non-infringement for the diacid, and to also assess the two other salts that had initially been at stake in first instance proceedings.
Protective letters are frequently used. See the most important do’s and don’ts here. In addition, note that protective letters can be filed by a legal representative or the party itself, but not by a patent attorney.
The audience unanimously critcized decisions D2015_035 of 08 March 2016 (hn: A protective letter may not be withdrawn) and, to less extent, D2015_035 of 09 February 2016 (no later addendum to a protective letter, except for proper and improper novae).
By the way: A protective letter may not only be useful in anticipation of a request for ex parte interim injunctive relief, but also in anticipation of a request for preliminary measures to secure evidence like this one here.
S2017_002 and S2017_003 made clear which requirements are to be fulfilled for an ex parte register ban to be successful; the former failed, the latter has been successful.
It became clear in the discussion that the surprising effect is not the only motivation for practitioners to request ex parte interim measures. Actually, ex parte interim measures are perceived by some as the only way to get speedy relief. Interim measures typically take seven to twelve months if they really dive deep into the subject-matter at stake (which is more the rule rather than the exception). Some participants questioned whether there is actually any difference to main proceedings, besides the fact that judicial vacations are not applicable. Sure, court fees are reduced — but so is the party compensation. On the other hand, parties typically do not perceive that the reasonable effort in summary proceedings is reduced by half.
iii) Service of process
Two Swiss parts of European patents have been recently revoked by the FPC in judgements rendered in absentia; O2015_007 and O2015_017. The patentees / defendants did not respond at all. At least for O2015_007, it is clear meanwhile that this happened by accident; see the detailed discussion here. In both cases, the U.S. patentee / defendant had been directly served with the writ in accordance with the Hague Convention and Art. 137 CPC. In accordance with U.S. rules, the Swiss embassy in the U.S. thus served the writ to the patentees / defendants by registered letter. In the absence of any reaction, the FPC had published subsequent notifications to the patentees / defendants only in the Swiss Official Gazette of Commerce; Art. 141 CPC.
It has been proposed that the FPC could at least bring the subsequent publications in the Swiss Official Gazette of Commerce also to the attention of the representative on file at the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property for the patent in suit.
On a personal note: I have my doubts. (I have been involved in O2015_007, but this case is finally concluded now.) It may well appear formalistic to only publish a notification in the Swiss Official Gazette of Commerce when contact details of a representative of the patent are available from Swissreg. As a patent attorney on file in Swissreg, one may easily find it unsatisfactory to just be ignored. But it’s the law. Even if such an additional notification would not constitute a breach of judicial confidentiality: It surely is more than what is required by law. Nota bene: In inter-partes proceedings. Any assistance by a court for the potential benefit of one party is of potential disadvantage for the respective other party; and I cannot see any superordinated public interest, either. This is why I am hesitant. But may the lawyers have their say on this.
iv) Doctrine of Equivalents
Discussion of decision 4A_131/2016 of the Supreme Court highlighted the apparent gap in the assessment of literal infringement and infringement under the DoE; see this Blog here. But let’s focus on the positive: The three-step questionnaire for the assessment of infringement under the DoE is approved. Let’s await the next decision(s) of the Supreme Court which hopefully provide further guidance.
As to the assessement of the third question in O2015_004, it has been discussed whether the actual wording of a claim is more binding if the alternatives are readily apparent — both for the person skilled in the art reading the patent, as well as for the patentee when drafting the application. (Note that Hepp Wenger Ryffel is involved in this matter, and the decision is not yet final. It can thus not yet be discussed in detail here.)
v) Abandonment of subject-matter
A further interesting aspect of O2015_004 surely is the issue of abandonment of subject matter; see this Blog here for further details. (Note that Hepp Wenger Ryffel is involved in this matter, and the decision is not yet final. It can thus not yet be discussed in detail here.)
Discussion briefly touched decisions 4A_427/2016 of the Supreme Court with respect to the legal standard of implied confidentiality (see this Blog here) and S2016_002 with respect to the admitted prior art as supporting basis for claim construction (see this Blog here).
Reported by Martin WILMING
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The independent claims of EP’508 read as follows (emphasis added):
1. Use of pemetrexed disodium in the manufacture of a medicament for use in combination therapy for inhibiting tumor growth in mammals wherein said medicament is to be administered in combination with vitamin B12 or a pharmaceutical derivative thereof, said pharmaceutical derivative of vitamin B12 being hydroxocobalamin, cyano-10-chlorocobalamin, aquocobalamin perchlorate, aquo-10-chlorocobalamin perchlorate, azidocobalamin, chlorocobalamin or cobalamin.
12. A product containing pemetrexed disodium, vitamin B 12 or a pharmaceutical derivative thereof said pharmaceutical derivative of vitamin B12 being hydroxocobalamin, cyano-10-chlorocobalamin, aquocobalamin perchlorate, aquo-10-chlorocobalamin perchlorate, azidocobalamin, chlorocobalamin or cobalamin, and, optionally, a folic binding protein binding agent selected from the group consisting of folic acid, (6R)-5-methyl-5,6,7,8-tetrahydrofolic acid and (6R)-5-formyl-5,6,7,8-tetrahydrofolic acid, or a physiologically available salt or ester thereof, as a combined preparation for the simultaneous, separate or sequential use in inhibiting tumor growth.
Pemetrexed disodium (see structural formula below) is marketed by Lilly under the trademark Alimta®. Stakes are high for Lilly: Alimta® generated a worldwide revenue of $2,493 million in 2015; see Lilly’s Annual Report 2015, p F31. The drug is used as a cancer medication that interferes with the growth and spread of cancer cells in the body; see drugs.com for further information.
The attacked embodiment is Actavis‘ Amtiris® which makes use of pemetrexed diacid instead of pemetrexed disodium (see structural formula above). Amtiris® had been approved by Swissmedic on 23 March 2016; see Swissmedic Journal 03/2016. Please refer to the interactive 3D structure below to get an idea of how pemetrexed dicacid actually looks like:
Literal infringement was not an issue. The present decision is all about the question of whether or not the use of pemetrexed diacid might constitute an infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents (DoE).
Note that the wording of the claim had been narrowed down during prosecution in order to overcome the examiner’s objections and to proceed to grant: The broad term antifolate had been more precisely defined as pemetrexed in first place, and finally even further as pemetrexed disodium. The FPC thus assessed whether the DoE is applicable at all to the feature pemetrexed disodium. The FPC notes that the patentee is bound by limitations he had accepted during prosecution in order to obtain the patent, and that he is therefore prevented under principles of good faith (Art. 2 CC) to circumvent this limitation by asserting equivalence. The FPC refers to a decision HG060066 of the Commercial Court Zurich in this respect. This is not to be confused with the Prosecution History Estoppel known in the U.S. — it rather highlights that the prosecution history is not just irrelevant.
Für die Beurteilung der Bedeutung dieser von der Patentinhaberin im Laufe des Erteilungsverfahrens vorgenommenen Einschränkung ist davon auszugehen, dass die Schweiz, wie andere Europäische Länder auch, keine Prosecution History Estoppel, wie sie in USA angewandt wird, kennt. Das heisst aber keineswegs, dass die Erteilungsgeschichte in der Schweiz völlig ausser Acht gelassen werden kann.
The FPC consequently held that the request for interim injunctive relief had to be dismissed for this reason alone.
For the sake of completeness, the FPC additionally assessed infringement under the DoE. The FPC’s 3-step questionnaire has recently been approved by the Supreme Court.
The first question to be answered is whether the replaced features have the same objective function. The FPC essentially relied on the fact that the attacked embodiment is a Swissmedic approved generic version of Alimta®, ie the pemetrexed disodium containing product. The same objective function was thus held to be given.
The second question asks whether the replaced features and their same objective function are made obvious to the skilled person by the teaching of the patent. See also the clarifying headnote of O2014_002 on how the FPC expects this question to be addressed. The FPC held that the skilled person knows that pemetrexed diacid would be at least partially deprotonated under physiological conditions, and that both pemetrexed diacid and pemetrexed disodium will result in the same pemetrexed dianion. Concluding, the skilled person would thus have expected the diacid to have the same effect (based on the anion). The FPC expressly dissents with the judgement of the England and Wales Court of Appeal ( EWCA Civ 555, #71) in this respect.
Finally, the third question asks whether it is evident for the skilled person that the replaced feature has the same effect, starting from the teaching of the patent in suit. Would the skilled person have understood the wording pemetrexed disodium as a strict limitation? The FPC notes that other components are defined more broadly in the claims, ie vitamin B12 or a pharmaceutical derivative thereof. Not so for pemetrexed disodium. The skilled person would thus have understood this as an intentional limitation, in further view of the specification. The patent refers to antifolates in paragaph  as follows (emphasis added):
The terms “antifolate” and “antifolate drug” generally refer to a chemical compound which inhibits at least one key folate-requiring enzyme of the thymidine or purine biosynthetic pathways, preferably thymidylate synthase (“TS”), dihydrofolate reductase (“DHFR”), or glycinamide ribonucleotide formyltransferase (“GARFT”), by competing with reduced folates for binding sites of these enzymes. The “antifolate” or “antifolate drug” for use in this invention is Pemetrexed Disodium (ALIMTA®), as manufactured by Eli Lilly & Co.
The FPC thus answered the third question in the negative, expressly consenting with the judgement of the England and Wales Court of Appeal ( EWCA Civ 555, #72) in this respect. The FPC also sides with the German Federal Supreme Court’s decision X ZR 29/15 in parallel proceedings in that the present matter is not an abandonment in the sense of X ZR 16/09 – Okklusionsvorrichtung. In Okklusionvorrichtung the replacing feature had been explicitly mentioned in the specification; not so in the present matter. However, the FPC notes that this does not automatically mean that a contrario the third question is to be answered in the affirmative.
Der BGH fokussiert sich bei der Beurteilung der dritten Äquivalenzfrage allerdings sehr auf diese Frage des Verzichts. Dem kann nicht gefolgt werden. Die Tatsache, dass kein Verzicht gemäss Okklusionsvorrichtung vorliegt, bedeutet keineswegs automatisch im Umkehrschluss, dass die 3. Äquivalenz-Frage zu bejahen ist. Das greift zu kurz.
The FPC thus dismissed Lilly’s request for interim injunctive relief in summary proceedings. Main proceedings are still pending (O2015_004).
As to Germany, there is the most recent decision X ZR 29/15 of the Federal Supreme Court. Please find the whole course of proceedings through the various instances in Germany here. Interim injunctive relief has been granted by the Regional Court Munich I in matters 21 O 22243/15 and 21 O 5583/16.
The FPC dismissed Lilly’s request for interim injunctive relief in summary proceedings concerning a generic version of Lilly’s Alimta®, ie Actavis’ Amtiris®. While the claims of Lilly’s EP 1 313 508 B1 specifically require pemetrexed disodium, Amtiris® comprises pemetrexed diacid. The FPC held that limitation from antifolate to pemetrexed disodium during prosecution constitutes an abandonment of subject-matter. But even if it would not be considered an abandonment, the FPC denied an infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents since the skilled person would have understood the wording pemetrexed disodium as a strict limitation, in view of the claims in view of the specification. Main proceedings are still pending (O2015_004).
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