No recusal of the judge-rapporteur — but there still is an elephant in the room …

Reading time: 8 minutes

Case No. 4A_56/2019 (Supreme Court) | Decision of 27 May 2019 on appeal against O2017_024 (FPC) | Order of 11 December 2018

The Supreme Court had to deal with an appeal against an (unpublished) order issued by the Administrative Commission (AC) of the FPC in case no. O2017_024, by which order the requested recusal of the judge-rapporteur had been denied. Defendant / appellant felt that some statements of the judge-rapporteur at the occasion of the instruction hearing (Art. 226 CPC) gave rise to the appearance of bias. It is important to understand that the instruction hearing at the FPC consists of two parts (Art. 8(4) of the Guidelines on Proceedings before the Federal Patent Court), i.e.:

a)   The court delegation discusses with the parties the matter at issue, asks questions where the party submissions are unclear, and provides substantiation advice. Evidence may also be accepted. This first part is transcribed.

b)   The court delegation explains its preliminary assessment of the matter in dispute off the record and attempts to bring about a settlement between the parties. The parties and the Court are prohibited from subsequently invoking any submissions made during this second part of the hearing; it serves exclusively to bring about a settlement.

Notably, the appellant did not object to the formal part a) of the instruction hearing (where the judicial duty to ask and inform applies), but rather to the informal part b) which serves exclusively to bring about a settlement.

After having read the first lines of the decision, I so much hoped that this decision would finally help me understand the metes and bounds of the informal part of the instruction hearing, and maybe even the formal part. Unfortunately, it doesn’t. The Supreme Court did not even assess the issue on the merits, but rather dismissed the appeal for formal reasons. What a pitty.

First, the Supreme Court holds that the appellant raised the objection belatedly, i.e. only 24 days after the instruction hearing. The Supreme Court did not buy into the argument that the procedural violations had only been noticed well after the instruction hearing (¶4.3):

It is not convincing that the appellant has only gained knowledge of the (alleged) ground for recusal until two weeks after the hearing, since the appellant does not object to a single error in the conduct of the proceedings, which may not be discernible at first sight, but «a large number of inadmissible statements by the judge-rapporteur», which «substantiated a serious violation of the duties of the judge by the disregard of fundamental principles of civil procedure.»


Further, the appellant criticised a statement made by the judge-rapporteur in his opinion of 26 September 2018, which the appellant considered would in itself give rise to the appearance of bias, and which should have been taken into account by the FPC’s AC ex officio. This statement is literally recited in the decision in ¶5.2, as follows (jump here for an English translation):

Die Instruktionsverhandlung dient gemäss Art. 226 ZPO unter anderem der freien Erörterung des Streitgegenstandes und dem Versuch einer Einigung. Um eine Einigung zu ermöglichen, nimmt der Instruktionsrichter eine vorläufige und unpräjudizielle Einschätzung der Sach- und Rechtslage vor. Dass es sich dabei um eine vorläufige Einschätzung handelt, die sich im Laufe des weiteren Verfahrens ändern kann und von den weiteren Mitgliedern des Spruchkörpers nicht geteilt werden muss, wird den Parteien klar kommuniziert. Die genannten Zwecke der Instruktionsverhandlung können nur erreicht werden, wenn sich der Instruktionsrichter – im Rahmen des von den Parteivorträgen umrissenen Streitgegenstandes – frei äussern kann. Eine strikte Bindung an einzelne Tatsachenbehauptungen ist in diesem frühen Verfahrensstadium, in dem das Behauptungsverfahren noch nicht abgeschlossen ist, nicht möglich und nicht zielführend.

Inofficially translated:

According to Art. 226 CPC, the instruction hearing serves, among other things, the free discussion of the subject matter in dispute and the attempt to reach an agreement. In order to enable an agreement to be reached, the judge-rapporteur makes a preliminary and unprejudiced assessment of the factual and legal situation. The parties are clearly informed that this is a preliminary assessment, which may change in the course of further proceedings and need not be shared by the other members of the panel. The stated purposes of the instruction hearing can only be achieved if the judge-rapporteur can freely express himself within the framework of the subject matter of the dispute outlined by the party submissions. A strict link to individual factual assertions is not possible and not expedient at this early stage of the proceedings, at which the assertion proceedings have not yet been concluded.

The FPC’s AC did not see any reason for recusal in the above statements. But still, and ‘for the sake of completeness’, the FPC’s AC addressed the opinion of the judge-rapporteur and concluded — in general terms, detached from the case at hand — that ‘there was no basis for supplementing the relevant alleged facts by the judge, neither outside nor within settlement discussions.’

[…] keine Grundlage für eine Ergänzung des relevanten behaupteten Sachverhalts durch den Richter, weder ausserhalb noch innerhalb von Vergleichsgesprächen.

A judge-rapporteur, navigating on difficult territory

I am not fully sure what is meant with ‘no basis’. If this is to be understood in a sense that supplementing the alleged facts (within or beyond ‘the framework of the subject matter of the dispute outlined by the party submissions’) is a clear no-go, then I could not agree more. It may be a tough exercise for a judge-rapporteur to stick to the facts as they have been asserted after only a single exchange of briefs, in particular when the forthcoming further assertions are all too obvious. But still, parties sometimes just do not make even the most obvious next assertion (intentionally or unintentionally), and any helping hand for a potentially negligent or ignorant party would be to the disadvantage of the respective other party.

But in the matter at hand, the Supreme Court did not need to deal with this issue on the merits. The decision holds that the appellant’s criticism misses the point: Procedural errors (as well as a decision that is potentially wrong on the merits) cannot in themselves justify the appearance of bias. The situation is different only if there are particularly blatant or repeated errors which must be assessed as a serious violation of the duties of the judge. Consequently, the request for recusal of a judge cannot normally serve to assess alleged procedural or other errors of the judge. Such complaints must be raised on appeal; see 4A_149/2018 in ¶5.2. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did expressly not assess to what extent the statements made by the judge-rapporteur — in particular the last two sentences — are in conformity with the law. The only decisive point is, in the Supreme Court’s view, that this statement was not a particularly blatant error of such a kind that would make the rejected judge appear almost biased. Thus, also appellant’s second criticism failed.

Now, what can be learned from this decision?

Unfortunately, not too much for the time being, because the Supreme Court took a formal shortcut. But, in my perception, there is some handwriting on the wall, isnt’t it? And, maybe, we will see the appellant’s second criticism being raised again on appeal if this case moves on and the appellant / defendant is unsuccessful in first instance proceedings on the merits.

UPDATE 27 January 2020:

From this presentation I just learned that the litigants were Rotho Kunststoff and Keter Plastic. See slides 10/11.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. 4A_56/2019 (Supreme Court) | Decision of 27 May 2019 on appeal against O2017_024 (FPC) | Order of 11 December 2018

n/a (appellant / defendant)
./.
n/a (respondent / plaintiff)

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Christina KISS
    • Dr. Fabienne HOHL
    • Marie-Chantal MAY CANELLAS

Court Clerk:

  • Dr. Christian KÖLZ

Representative(s) of Appellant:

  • Dr. Rudolf A. RENTSCH (IPrime)

Representative(s) of Respondent:

  • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)

SUPREME COURT
on appeal against O2017_024 (FPC) | Order of 11 December 2018
Case no.: 4A_56/2019
Decision of: 27 May 2019
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PATENT COURT
Case no.: O2017_024
Order of: 11 December 2018

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The heat is on between Laurastar and Innosteam

Case No. O2018_016 | Hearing of 25 June 2019

Reading time: 7 minutes
Laurastar logo

Laurastar and Innosteam are litigating about ownership of two PCT applications, WO 2018/006994 A1 and WO 2018/036653 A1; see the EPO Register here and here. The patent applications are about devices and methods for producing instant steam (WO’994) and instant hot water (WO’653), for use e.g. in devices for ironing.

Innosteam logo

Briefly, plaintiff alleges that the subject matter of both PCT applications had been invented by the inventors in fulfillment of their contractual duties while they were employees of Laurastar.

We have reported on this Blog here about the provisional register ban that had been issued without hearing the defendant beforehand, and the subsequent hearing. The register ban had finally been maintained in summary proceedings S2018_003; see this Blog here.

Note that both PCT applications have meanwhile been nationalized inter alia at the EPO, but the EPO has stayed its proceedings on request of Laurastar SA pursuant to R. 14(1) EPC while main proceedings at the FPC are pending; see here (re WO’693) and here (re WO’994). It is still (too) early to obtain full and complete information about the status of nationalization elsewhere in the world, but WIPO’s PatentScope indicates further nationalizations in the Ukraine and the Russian Federation; see here (re WO’653) and here (re WO’994). Anyway, we could now catch a glimpse of what is going on in main proceedings O2018_016 at the hearing on June 25, 2019 in Neuchâtel. The hearing was held in French language — well, at least the most of it.

Plaintiff’s pleadings emphasized that the invention was conceived before the inventors left Laurastar SA to work for Innosteam Swiss SA. A significant part of the argument evolved around a document created by Mr. Pasche that allegedly shows all the features of the patent applications in question (hereinafter refered to as ‘Pasche’):

The document created by M. Pasche while employed by the plaintiff

But even if there were any potential differences between Pasche and the two patent applications, they were only of minor importance and could not render the claimed subject-matter inventive. And, in the plaintiff’s view, this has to be taken into account; else, one could just steal an invention, add an insignificant feature to it and be unassailable.

Plaintiff further questioned to what extent a detailed claim analysis, as apparently done by the judge rapporteur, was appropriate. In the plaintiff’s view, the claims are still subject to change and do not necessarily represent the invention as a whole. For this reason, according to the plaintiff, the judge rapporteur should have analyzed the description as well. In addition, plaintiff argued that the inventiveness of the subject matter over Pasche should have been analyzed as well.

Defendant, by contrast, argued that the subject-matter outlined in Pasche was free state of the art, in any event. Thus, even if it showed all the features of the patent applications in question, just for the sake of argument, it could not be proprietary to Laurastar SA or anybody else. This led to some discussion about the term ‘invention’: Does it imply non-obviousness over the prior art, i.e. an inventive step? It has been argued that under the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 332), an invention does not require an inventive step (emphasis added):

Inventions and designs produced by the employee alone or in collaboration with others in the course of his work for the employer and in performance of his contractual obligations belong to the employer, whether or not they may be protected.

A decision on these issues might be an interesting read — if the parties haven’t settled.

On the procedural side, the hearing was quite illustrative of Switzerland:

Defendant’s representative started his pleadings with reference to the federalism in Switzerland and explained that he was going to structure his pleadings according to what is customary in Geneva. This may have contributed to some confusion that arose after a (brief) first part of defendant’s pleadings. Defendant’s representative sat back down, and the President asked if he was done, which the representative affirmed. The president then firmly told the parties that the time to make arguments was now:

Le temps de répondre, c’est maintenant!

This prompted defendant’s councel to get back up again and finish his pleadings. The assisting patent attorney then added his share to the pleadings — in German language. This was apparently not appreciated by everybody in the room, and the opposing patent attorney could not help himself but leave a snarky remark about this in his own pleadings later.

I wonder whether I should better immediately refresh my French and learn some Italian, just to be prepared for some spontaneous pleadings in a language that hasn’t been announced beforehand(?).  (Just kidding) /MW
Where do we go now?

At the end of the hearing, the President asked whether the parties were interested in settlement talks. Both parties gave answers along the same lines, saying that in principle they would of course be interested in a settlement. However, neither party found it realistic to find a mutually agreeable compromise since a joint assignment of the patent applications was not desirable to either party. Thus, according to both parties, settlement negotiations were pointless.

OMG

The President buried the face in his hands and, after a sigh, explained to the parties in German (‘Erlauben Sie mir, das auf Deutsch zu sagen’) that it was conceivable that a judgment could give exactly that result: Joint ownership. Such a forced marriage may not facilitate things for either party and the President gently reminded both parties that a settlement may well be the better course of action.

A three-legged race is a tricky exercise. It may work, but one may also stumble miserably.

The parties asked for a short break to discuss the President’s comment, after which it was discussed non-publicly whether the parties may be willing to settle after all.

Reported by Philippe KNÜSEL and Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2018_016 | Hearing of 25 June 2019

Laurastar SA
./.
Innosteam Swiss SA

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Mark SCHWEIZER
  • Dr. Ralph SCHLOSSER
  • Dr. Giovanni GERVASIO

Judge-rapporteur:

  • Dr. Giovanni GERVASIO

Court Clerk:

  • Agnieszka TABERSKA

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

  • Dominique GUEX (Bourgeois)
  • André ROLAND (Roland), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant:

ANNOUNCEMENT

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WO 2018/006994 A1

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WO 2018/036653 A1

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A Swiss approach to the EPO’s gold standard

Reading time: 5 minutes

Case No. O2016_016 | Decision of 6 June 2019

The patent at stake is MundiPharma‘s EP 2 425 825 B9; see EPO Register and Swissreg. EP’825 pertains to a combination of oxycodone hydrochloride (in an amount of 10 to 150g) and naloxone hydrochloride (in an amount of 1 to 50g), in a weight ratio of 2:1.

This combination is an analgesic drug that is available as modified-release tablets under the trade name Targin® by MundiPharma.

Develco’s logo

Develco sought annulment of EP(CH)’825 for various reasons, i.e. undue extension of subject-matter, non-enablement and invalidity of the priority claim. Please see this Blog here for a brief summary of the main hearing in this matter, and some relevant prior art Develco has asserted against patentability of the claimed subject-matter.

MundiPharma’s logo

Defendant / patentee MundiPharma countersued for infringement. MundiPharma not only countersued the plaintiff, but rather also attempted to involve the German branch of Develco as well as Konapharma. This attempt failed.

It was evident from the pleadings at the main hearing that the expert opinion of the judge-rapporteur had held that the patent was invalid for undue extension of subject-matter. Thus, it does not come as a big surprise in the decision that EP(CH)’825 is held invalid for undue extension of subject-matter. Consequently, the decision does not address the other grounds of invalidity asserted by Develco; and the counterclaim for infringement is moot, too.

In my perception, the detailed assessment of undue extension of subject-matter is nothing out of the ordinary. It’s all about the EPO’s ‘gold standard’ (G 2/10 in ¶4.3, with reference to G 3/89 and G 11/91), i.e.

[…] any amendment […] can […] only be made within the limits of what a skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, and seen objectively and relative to the date of filing, from the whole of [the application as filed].

What is interesting, though, is how the decision addresses the so-called essentiallity-test (‘Wesentlichkeits-Test’), in particular how this test fits with the ‘gold standard’. In brief, in T 331/87 the Board held that the replacement or removal of a feature from a claim may (referred to in the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal as a ‘might’) not be in breach of Art. 123(2) EPC if the skilled person would directly and unambiguously recognise that

  1. the feature was not explained as essential in the disclosure;
  2. it was not, as such, indispensable for the function of the invention in the light of the technical problem it served to solve; and
  3. the replacement or removal required no real modification of other features to compensate for the change.

It is important to note that even this Board apparently (in view of the conditional language used; see mark-up above) did not consider compliance with the above three criteria as a sufficient condition for compliance with Art.123(2) EPC in any given case. Accordingly, the present decision holds that the only thing that really matters is the ‘gold standard’ discussed above, which cannot be deviated from. With reference to the Swiss Supreme Court decision 4A_109/2011, 4A_111/2011 (¶4.3.1), however, the decision further holds that in a case where not even the criteria of the essentiallity test are fulfilled, it must be assumed that an undue extension of subject-matter occured.

What suprises me, though, is that the decision holds (¶31):

Otherwise this would again amount to a materiality test, which was expressly rejected in G 2/98.

Frankly, I don’t see that in G 2/98, at least not expressly (‘ausdrücklich’). One may well conclude from the gist of G 2/98, in particular ¶8.3, that it does not endorse a distinction of technical features which are related to the function and effect of the invention and technical features which are not. But there is no discussion of the essentiallity test at all in G 2/98. Else, if there was, the essentiallity test would surely not be referred to anymore in the most recent edition of the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal and the Guidelines.

But still, my personal take-away message from this decision is that the essentiallity test is of no avail in proceedings at the FPC (until someone comes along and proves me wrong).

The decision is not yet final / may still be appealed to the Supreme Court.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2016_016 | Decision of 6 June 2019

Develco Pharma Schweiz AG
./.
MundiPharma Medical Company

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Daniel M. ALDER
  • Dr. Tobias BREMI
  • Dr. Hannes SPILLMANN

Judge-rapporteur:

  • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Develco:

  • Andrea MONDINI (TIMES)
  • Dr. Cornelia HOFFMANN (SBMP), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Mundipharma:

  • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
  • Dr. Dirk BÜHLER (Maiwald), assisting in patent matters
  • Dr. Andreas LEDL (Maiwald), assisting in patent matters

DECISION

Don’t be misled by the patent no. on the bottom of the title page. EP 2 245 825 is a typo; this should read EP 2 425 825.
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Lilly’s patent on combination of pemetrexed and vitamin B12 challenged

Case No. O2018_003 ¦ Hearing of 17 June 2019

Reading time: 6 minutes

The patent in suit is Lilly‘s EP 1 313 508 B1; see the EPO Register and Swissreg for further information. The independent claims of EP’508 read as follows (emphasis added):

1.   Use of pemetrexed disodium in the manufacture of a medicament for use in combination therapy for inhibiting tumor growth in mammals wherein said medicament is to be administered in combination with vitamin B12 or a pharmaceutical derivative thereof, said pharmaceutical derivative of vitamin B12 being hydroxocobalamin, cyano-10-chlorocobalamin, aquocobalamin perchlorate, aquo-10-chlorocobalamin perchlorate, azidocobalamin, chlorocobalamin or cobalamin.

12.   A product containing pemetrexed disodium, vitamin B12 or a pharmaceutical derivative thereof said pharmaceutical derivative of vitamin B12 being hydroxocobalamin, cyano-10-chlorocobalamin, aquocobalamin perchlorate, aquo-10-chlorocobalamin perchlorate, azidocobalamin, chlorocobalamin or cobalamin, and, optionally, a folic binding protein binding agent selected from the group consisting of folic acid, (6R)-5-methyl-5,6,7,8-tetrahydrofolic acid and (6R)-5-formyl-5,6,7,8-tetrahydrofolic acid, or a physiologically available salt or ester thereof, as a combined preparation for the simultaneous, separate or sequential use in inhibiting tumor growth.

It’s all about a combination of the antifolate pemetrexed disodium, vitamin B12 and, optionally, folic acid. Briefly, pemetrexed is an antifolate that inter alia inhibits synthesis of thymidine and thus de novo DNA synthesis. Evidently, antifolates are quite toxic. But according to EP’508, toxicity can be successfully controlled by co-administration of pemetrexed with vitamin B12 and, optionally, folic acid.

Pemetrexed disodium
Pemetrexed disodium

EP’508 had already been litigated in infringement proceedings in Switzerland, resulting in a landmark decision of the Supreme Court on the Doctrine of Equivalents and how amendments of the patent during prosecution are to be dealt with in this respect; see this Blog here.

This time, validity of EP’508 is being challenged, based on a lack of novelty or, at least, lack of an inventive step; and added matter. Only inventive step has been pleaded in the hearing. With respect to the other grounds of nullity, the Sandoz merely referred to the written submissions.

It was evident from the pleadings that the opinion of the judge-rapporteur had been in favour of the defendant. This interim opinion is in line with the decision of an EPO opposition division, the Rechtbank Den Haag (Case No. C/09/533354 / HA ZA 17-581; judgment available as Dutch original and inofficial English translation), the IP High Court of Japan and the U.S. CAFC. On the other hand, the German Federal Patent Court had revoked the German part of EP’508; an appeal before the Supreme Court is still pending.

Sandoz’s logo

Sandoz started from Jackman as closest prior art in the assessment of inventive step. With reference to Worzalla et al., Jackman describes experiments in which pemetrexed was administered alongside with folic acid. Further, phase I clinical trials had been reported in which pemetrexed was administered together with folic acid (Hammond et al.). In consideration of the biochemical pathways, Sandoz argued that it had been obvious to add vitamin B12 to said known combination.

Lilly’s logo

Eli Lilly of course disagreed. In Lilly’s view, the skilled person would not have pursued a combination of pemetrexed and folic acid, let alone to add vitamin B12. In real life, phase II clinical trials began with pemetrexed alone, irrespective of the experiments of Hammond et al. Toxicity of pemetrexed had intially been deemed controllable. It was only in the course of phase II clinical trials that the therapy scheme was switched because toxicity was found to be too severe.

A significant point of discussion was whether a skilled person would have been motivated to add vitamin B12 in light of some marker experiments. Niyikiza, the main inventor of the patent in suit, had published a report that described a correlation of pemetrexed toxicity with an unspecific marker (homocysteine), but not with the vitamin B12-specific marker MMA (methlymalonic acid). Accordingly, in Lilly’s view, a skilled person would not have been prompted towards the invention.

Reported by Andreas WELCH and Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2018_003 ¦ Hearing of 17 June 2019

Sandoz Pharmaceuticals AG
./.
Eli Lilly and Company

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Daniel ALDER
  • Dr. Roland DUX
  • Marco ZARDI

Judge-rapporteur:

  • Dr. Roland DUX

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

  • Dr. Markus WANG (Bär & Karrer)
  • Christoph FRAEFEL (SBMP), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant:

ANNOUNCEMENT

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What’s the point about pointer?

Reading time: 4 minutes

Case No. O2016_017 | Hearing of 3 June 2019

The patent at stake is MundiPharma‘s EP 2 425 825 B9; see EPO Register and Swissreg. Besides Acino Pharma AG, the plaintiff in the present proceedings, Develco is also fighting this patent in parallel proceedings; see this Blog here.

EP’825 pertains to a combination of oxycodone hydrochloride (in an amount of 10 to 150g) and naloxone hydrochloride (in an amount of 1 to 50g), in a weight ratio of 2:1.

This combination is an analgesic drug that is available as modified-release tablets under the trade name Targin® by MundiPharma. Oxycodone is an opioid that has pain-relieving effects. Naloxone opposes the effects of opioids but is poorly absorbed when given orally; it stays within the gastrointestinal tract and reduces the local side effects of oxycodone.

Acino’s logo

Acino seeks annulment of EP(CH)’825 for various reasons, i.e. undue extension of subject-matter, non-enablement and invalidity of the priority claim. On the merits, Acino argues that EP’825 is not novel over WO 01/58451 A1, and that it is obvious in view of WO 01/58447 A1 (if the claim to priority is invalid) or in view of WO 02/092060 A1. Further documents referred to by the plaintiff in the assessment of obviousness are US 3,966,940, US 3,773,955 (erroneously referred to as US 3,773,995 in the announcement) and a paper of Skarin (most likely this one).

MundiPharma’s logo

Defendant / patentee MundiPharma countersued for infringement.

It was evident from the pleadings that the expert opinion of the judge-rapporteur had held that the patent was invalid for undue extension of subject-matter. Note that the first instance decision at the EPO (11 December 2018) came to the same conclusion, but an appeal is still pending at the EPO.

The hearing has again been thematically structured, similar to O2016_016. I could only attend until noon, and not even the most controversial issue of undue extension of subject-matter had been finished. Still, I believe that the major issues had already been raised at that time. Patentee had submitted that if the ‘pointer concept‘ in the assessment of whether or not sth is clearly and unambiguously disclosed in the application as filed would be properly used, no undue extension of subject-matter had occured. The ‘two lists concept‘ must not be used as an end in itself, but it is rather only the so-called gold standard that applies (clear and unambiguous disclosure in the application as filed, in the skilled persons understanding).

It will be very interesting to see how this will play out. Stay tuned.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2016_017 | Hearing of 3 June 2019

Acino Pharma AG
./.
MundiPharma Medical Company

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Daniel M. ALDER
  • Dr. Tobias BREMI
  • Dr. Hannes SPILLMANN

Judge-rapporteur:

  • n/a

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Acino:

Representative(s) of Mundipharma:

  • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
  • Dr. Dirk BÜHLER (Maiwald), assisting in patent matters

ANNOUNCEMENT

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Fumarate and phosphate: Same same, but different?

Reading time: 6 minutes

Case No. O2017_023 | Decision of 3 May 2019

DISCLOSURE NOTICE

Hepp Wenger Ryffel is involved in this case on behalf of the defendant.

This case is about an alleged infringement of Gilead’s SPC C00915894; the basic patent is EP 0 915 894 B1 (see EPO Register and Swissreg). Gilead’s products are Truvada® and Atripla® which are pharmaceuticals for the treatment of HIV-1 infection.

The present main proceedings are following-up on summary proceedings S2017_006 when the FPC granted interim injunctive relief; see this Blog here. Validity of the SPC was not an issue anymore, this had already been affirmed by the Supreme Court; see this Blog here.

The dispute is all about whether or not the scope of an SPC that specifically refers to a unique salt form does extend to other salts; we had reported about the main hearing in this matter on this Blog here. The SPC concerns tenofovir disoproxil fumarat + emtricitabin (emphasis added) . Mepha’s attacked generics (Swissmedic MAs No. 66181 and 66217)  instead comprise tenofovir disoproxil phosphate.

Now, is that still the ‘product’ in the sense of Art. 140d PatA?

The decision holds in ¶26-27 that in order to not frustrate the objective of an SPC the understanding of the term ‘product’ in the context of an SPC must be aligned with the understanding of the same term in the context of the Therapeutic Products Act (TPA). Thus, the scope of protection is not strictly limited to what is named in the MA or in the SPC, but rather extends to derivatives, salt forms, etc. which do not differ significantly in their properties with regard to safety and/or efficacy. In other words, the decision holds that the scope of protection extends to everything for which a simplified approval according to the TPA can be obtained (see Swissmedic Guidelines, ¶1.1.1).

Thus, the decision holds that the ‘product’ in the sense of Art. 140d PatA is (¶28):

Emtricitabine plus tenofovirdisoproxil fumarate and all derivatives (i.e. in particular all salt forms) thereof, provided that they have the same pharmacological effects.

Since the attacked embodiments had been approved by Swissmedic by way of a simplified approval, the decision holds that they are presumed to have the same pharmacological effects and are thus the same ‘product’ in the sense of Art. 140d PatA.

For the sake of completeness, the decision also analyses the alleged infringement under the DoE (¶33 et seqq.). As proposed by some scholars, the scope of protection of an SPC is determined by the content of the claims of the basic patent, whereby the description and the drawings are to be used for interpretation, and the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 EPC is also to be observed. Since the SPC is only product-related and purpose-related, the patent claim of the basic patent is to be defined artificially as if only the active substance designated in the certificate were mentioned, for the approved use of the active substance as a pharmaceutical. The description and drawings of the basic patent shall be used for the interpretation of the claim so formulated.

In brief, the decision holds that the three questions of the Swiss test for infringement under the DoE are to be answered in the affirmative, i.e. that the ‘same effect’ (Gleichwirkung), ‘obviousness’ (Auffindbarkeit) and ‘same value’ (Gleichwertigkeit) are given. Noteworthy, the decision holds that one cannot assume that the SPC holder made a purposive selection in favor of one salt over other salts mentioned in the specification. If one were to see this differently, equivalence for SPCs in different salt forms would in fact be excluded if only one specific salt had been used for the MA and the wording of the SPC. On the contrary, on the basis of an objective reading of the patent specification and in the knowledge that such an artificial claim is to be interpreted for the scope of protection of an SPC, the skilled person will readily assume that other salts,  because they are mentioned in the description, are not excluded from the scope of protection (¶43):

Im Gegenteil wird der fachkundige Dritte bei objektiver Lektüre der Patentschrift und im Wissen darum, dass ein solcher fiktiver Anspruch für den Schutzbereich eines ESZ auszulegen ist, in einer solchen Situation gerade davon ausgehen, dass natürlich diese anderen Salzformen, weil sie in der Beschreibung genannt werden, nicht vom Schutzumfang ausgeschlossen sind.

In any event, the decision holds that there was no specific, individualized disclosure of tenofovir disoproxil phosphate in the specification of the basic patent.

LDCs

Injunctive relief was thus granted. However, Mepha shall be permitted to export products that it had on stock when interim injunctive relief had been granted to any of the least developed countries, LDCs, according to the list of the the United Nations.

The decision is still open to appeal.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2017_023 | Decision of 3 May 2019

Gilead Sciences Inc.
./.
Mepha Pharma AG

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Christoph GASSER
  • Dr. Tobias BREMI
  • Marco ZARDI

Judge-rapporteur:

  • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

  • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
  • Dr. Kilian SCHÄRLI (MLL)
  • Dr. Michael RITSCHER (MLL)
  • Dr. Andreas SCHÖLLHORN (LSP), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant:

DECISION IN FULL

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Hip Hip Hooray: Stemcup and Implantec litigating about the ANA.NOVA hybrid socket

Reading time: 8 minutes

Case No. O2016_012 | Hearing of 29 May 2019

The patent in suit is EP 1 411 869 B1; see Swissreg and EPO Register for further information. Stemcup alleges that Implantec‘s ANA.NOVA® hybrid socket infringes the patent (either literally or under the DoE):

Implantec’s ANA.NOVA® hybrid socket website

See Implantec's ANA.NOVA® product flyer for further information about the allegedly infringing product.

Defendant (1) is the Austrian manufacturing company of the allegedly infringing ANA.NOVA® hybrid socket, which defendant (2) is then placing on the Swiss market.

The relevant claim 2 of EP’869 as initially granted reads as follows:

A socket (1) for an artificial hip joint with a base body or a shell (10) which comprises an in particular spherical, ellipsoidal or conical superficies (11) essentially rotationally symmetrical to the socket axis (AP), characterised in that on the outer side of the base body (10) there are arranged at least two locking elements (20) which in each case comprise a knock-in web (21) which from the distal web beginning up to the proximal web end defines at least a gradient of 85° to 60° with respect to the base surface (GP), which corresponds to an angle of twist of 5° to 30°.

ANA.NOVA® hybrid socket

To get a better idea of what is meant by ‘knock-in web (21)’ (or ‘Einschlagsteg’ in German), please see the winglets on the outer shell of the allegedly infringing product on the right.

According to the patent, the locking elements can twist the cup by a few degrees when the implant is driven in. In the plaintiff’s view, this is decisive for the patent in suit. Defendants contest the infringement and argue for invalidity as a plea in defense.

This case surfaced for the first time back in March 2017; see this Blog here. But one got no idea of the subject-matter at stake since that order only related to a procedural issue. The main hearing had been announced for 3 October 2018 for the first time, but it was cancelled. The silence was deafening since then. Finally, the main hearing took place on 29 May 2019, as announced.

The hearing

It is rare that a presiding judge at the FPC opens the main hearing with a remark that the case is somewhat special. But this case is indeed a bit out of the ordinary. In my understanding of the pleadings, the expert opinion of the judge-rapporteur had been quite positive for the plaintiff re infringement and validity — except for an undue extension of subject-matter in claim 2 as asserted.

Closed docket

Now, what to do after the formal closure of the file?

The plaintiff partially renounced EP’869 at the IPI, to overcome the objection. The partial renouncement has been published on 15 August 2018.

Claim 2 after the partial renouncement reads as follows (inofficially translated; changes marked-up):

A socket (1) for an artificial hip joint with a base body or a shell (10) which comprises an in particular spherical, ellipsoidal or conical superficies (11) essentially rotationally symmetrical to the socket axis (AP), characterised in that on the outer side of the base body (10) there are arranged at least two locking elements (20) which in each case comprise a knock-in web (21) which from the distal web beginning up to the proximal web end defines at least a continuous, linear gradient of 85° to 60° with respect to the base surface (GP), which corresponds to an angle of twist of 5° to 30°.

A first version of this post erroneously mentioned that only ‘at least’ had been deleted. This has been corrected in the above.

What had been uncomplicated on the merits at the IPI caused a lot of trouble in the pending proceedings at the FPC: The panel of judges had been enlarged to five judges, with the clear intention to render a decision on all aspects of the case. Consequently, the judge-rapporteur gave a second, updated expert opinion which, in my understanding, was again very positive for the plaintiff’s position re infringement and validity, but did not expand any further on the tricky issue of admissibility of the partial renouncement.

Noteworthy, the plaintiff’s statement of claim had not been changed. It was not in dispute between the parties that it was not a question of an amendment to the statement of claim; Art. 227 CPC. It’s all about whether or not the partial renouncement of the patent at this stage of the proceedings was admissible as a proper novum or improper novum, according to Art. 229 CPC.

The plaintiff holds that the partial renouncement is a proper novum that has been timely introduced into the proceedings, i.e. immediately upon registration with the IPI.

On the other hand, defendants essentially argue that a new fact created by the plaintiff’s own volition and at a time / to an extent of his own choice cannot be considered a proper novum, and that the plaintiff acted much too late in any event: The request for partial renouncement had been filed only about nine months after the defendants had raised the issue of an undue extension of subject-matter with their rejoinder. Defendants requested that the case be dismissed as groundless since the patent in suit does not exist anymore in the form as it once had been asserted.

Some further procedural issues arose with respect to admissibility of certain elements of defendants’ comments on the second expert opinion of the judge-rapporteur. Plaintiff requested in the hearing that it should be decided on this issue beforehand, for him to be in a position to comment the remainder, if any. This request was denied.

Further, defendants had prepared a slide deck to illustrate certain aspects of their pleading concerning the alleged infringement (presumably some tricky geometric concepts of how to properly measure a gradient, according to the patent in suit), and printouts of this slide deck had been handed over to the plaintiff and the judges before a break. Finally, however, the slide deck had not been used at all: The presiding judge returned the handouts to defendants’ counsel after the break and noted that the court will not expose itself to the accusation that it accepted novae into the file. Still, I well understood from the pleadings that defendants argue for non-infringement because the gradient in the attacked embodiment is outside of the claimed range. It’s a borderline case, apparently: Plaintiffs allege that the gradient is 84.7° (i.e. within the claimed range), while defendants allege that the gradient is 85.6° (i.e. outside the claimed range).

Unfortunately, I had to leave at about 2:15 pm and thus don’t know whether the parties finally had settlement talks. But, frankly, I would be surprised if the parties have settled.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2016_012 | Hearing of 29 May 2019

Stemcup Medical Products AG
./.
(1) Implantec GmbH
(2) ImplanTec Schweiz GmbH
(now Endoprothetik Schweiz GmbH)

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Christoph WILLI
  • Frank SCHNYDER
  • Dr. Daniel M. ALDER
  • Dr. Tobias BREMI
  • Dr. Kurt SUTTER

Judge-rapporteur:

  • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Stemcup :

Representative(s) of Implantec:

  • Dr. Michael RITSCHER (MLL)
  • Noelle STALDER (MLL)
  • Dr. Martin MÜLLNER (Müllner Katschinka), assisting in patent matters
  • Werner Roshardt (Keller), assisting in patent matters
  • Dr. Susanne FINKLENBURG (Keller), assisting in patent matters

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Main hearing of 29 May 2019:

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Main hearing of 3 October 2018 (cancelled):

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The FPC’s cancellation note:



PATENT IN SUIT

EP 1 411 869 B1 (as initially granted):

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CH/EP 1 411 869 H1 (after partial renouncement):

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NOTES FROM THE HEARING

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The first thematically structured main hearing at the FPC: Role model or nonstarter?

Reading time: 5 minutes

Case No. O2016_016 | Hearing of 8 May 2019

The patent at stake is MundiPharma‘s EP 2 425 825 B9; see EPO Register and Swissreg.

EP’825 pertains to a combination of oxycodone hydrochloride (in an amount of 10 to 150g) and naloxone hydrochloride (in an amount of 1 to 50g), in a weight ratio of 2:1.

This combination is an analgesic drug that is available as modified-release tablets under the trade name Targin® by MundiPharma. Oxycodone is an opioid that has pain-relieving effects. Naloxone opposes the effects of opioids but is poorly absorbed when given orally; it stays within the gastrointestinal tract and reduces the local side effects of oxycodone.

Develco’s logo

Develco seeks annulment of EP(CH)’825 for various reasons, i.e. undue extension of subject-matter, non-enablement and invalidity of the priority claim. On the merits, Develco argues that EP’825 is not novel over WO 01/58451 A1, and that it is obvious in view of EP 0 352 361 A1 or WO 01/58447 A1 or WO 02/092060 A1 or in view of the entry in the ‘Rote Liste’ 2001 for the product Valoron® N capsules from Gödecke.

MundiPharma’s logo

Defendant / patentee MundiPharma countersued for infringement.

It was evident from the pleadings that the expert opinion of the judge-rapporteur had held that the patent was invalid for undue extension of subject-matter. Note that the first instance decision at the EPO (11 December 2018) and the Barcelona Commercial Court No. 4 (19 December 2018) came to the same conclusion. While an appeal is still pending at the EPO, the decision in Spain is already final.

The most interesting part of the hearing was actually how the FPC had structured it. Normally, the parties are just given the floor, one after the other, to plead on all relevant aspects of the case. Not so this time. The FPC wanted to hear the parties on a single aspect only, before moving on to the next aspect. Very much like hearings at the EPO are conducted. Apparently, the FPC had also indicated beforehand that a preliminary opinion would be given on each aspect right after the pleadings relating thereto. However, the patentee / defendant objected, and the court thus abstained from doing so.

Maybe, or maybe not …

On a personal note, I don’t see much value in a ‘preliminary’ opinion of the court being issued in the main hearing. Since one cannot take this opinion for granted, one has to effectively ignore it in all the following pleadings, and be prepared for an outcome to the contrary.

But it still is an interesting approach that could well be taken to the next level, in my perception: What about making a break after the pleadings on each aspect for the judges to deliberate and actually decide on that issue, and pronounce the decision right thereafter? That works perfectly fine at the EPO, and a nullity case at the FPC doesn’t differ much.

Lawyers may prove me wrong, but I do not readily see why this shouldn’t be possible in civil proceedings governed by the CPC.

Reported by Tina VOCI and Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2016_016 | Hearing of 8 May 2019

Develco Pharma Schweiz AG
./.
MundiPharma Medical Company

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Daniel M. ALDER
  • Dr. Tobias BREMI
  • Dr. Hannes SPILLMANN

Judge-rapporteur:

  • n/a

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Develco:

  • Andrea MONDINI (TIMES)
  • Dr. Cornelia HOFFMANN (SBMP), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Mundipharma:

  • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
  • Dr. Dirk BÜHLER (Maiwald), assisting in patent matters

ANNOUNCEMENT

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PATENT IN SUIT

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Truvada®: PrEPared for a decision on the scope of an SPC

Reading time: 5 minutes

Case No. O2017_023 | Hearing of 4 April 2019

Note that Hepp Wenger Ryffel is involved in this case on behalf of the defendant.
Gilead’s Truvada®

This case is about an alleged infringement of Gilead’s SPC C00915894; the basic patent is EP 0 915 894 B1 (see EPO Register and Swissreg). Gilead’s product is Truvada®, a pharmaceutical for the treatment of HIV-1 infection. The present main proceedings are following-up on summary proceedings S2017_006 when the FPC granted interim injunctive relief; see this Blog here.

Validity of the SPC is not an issue anymore, it has already been affirmed by the Supreme Court; see this Blog here.

The supplementary protection certificate C00915894 is at stake; see the official court information about the hearing. The basic patent is EP 0 915 894 B1; see EPO Register and Swissreg.

The dispute is all about whether or not the scope of an SPC that specifically refers to a unique salt form does extend to other salts. The SPC concerns tenofovir disoproxil fumarat + emtricitabin (emphasis added) .

Mepha’s attacked embodiment instead comprises tenofovir disoproxil phosphate.

Now, is that still ‘the product’ in the sense of Art. 140d PatA?

The parties agreed to disagree on this issue in the hearing. Gilead insisted that the ‘typical product definition’ has to be applied, in a sense that the fumarate is only to be understood as a ‘reference’ for the assessment of whether or not yet another salt form has the same pharmacological effect. If it had, then it should be considered ‘the same product’.

On the other hand, Mepha argued that the term ‘product’ is defined in Art. 140a(2) PatA, and it is to be construed within the context of the PatA; the Therapeutic Products Act (TPA) was not relevant in this respect. Thus, infringement has to be assessed as it is routinely done, i.e. deciding on whether there is literal infringment or infringement under the DoE. Mepha argued that the SPC is neither literally infringed, nor under the DoE.

The expert opinion of the judge-rapporteur held that the SPC was infringed, apparently essentially along the line of Gilead’s arguments. Still, in case the court followed the expert opinion, Mepha requested the court to provide a full assessment of infringement in the judgment, also including an assessment of literal infringement and infringement under the DoE. The Supreme Court would then be in a position to review the whole matter at once and in a timely manner, without the need to remit the case back to the FPC to carry out yet another assessment.

As mentioned above, Truvada® is a pharmaceutical for the treatment of HIV-1 infection. But Mepha recently obtained the market authorization of its Emtricitabin-Tenofovir-Mepha® in Switzerland also for PrEP – which is short for Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis; see Swissmedic Journal 02/19. More information on PrEP can be found on Gilead’s website here. However, Gilead currrently has no MA for PrEP in Switzerland; Mepha’s MA is the only one in Switzerland for this indication.

PrEP likely is the reason why this case attracted quite some public attention. There has even been an organised Facebook event in St. Gallen; and flyer have been distributed, see here and here.

Groupe sida‘ activists

On a sidenote, when a member of the audience wore a shirt with one of these slogans on it, the presiding judge held that this was an attempt to influence the judges, and thus ordered him to either hide the slogan / change clothes; or to leave the court room.

The NZZ reported on the matter, as well as the ‘Tagesschau‘:

 
Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2017_023 | Hearing of 4 April 2019

Gilead Sciences Inc.
./.
Mepha Pharma AG

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Christoph GASSER
  • Dr. Tobias BREMI
  • Marco ZARDI

Judge-rapporteur:

  • Dr. Tobias BREMI

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

  • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
  • Dr. Andreas SCHÖLLHORN (LSP), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant:

ANNOUNCEMENT

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Roses are red; violets are blue — It’s all obvious! Well, is that true?

Reading time: 7 minutes

Case Nos. O2016_010, O2016_011 | Hearing of 20 March 2019

Twice upon a time …

I have attended the main hearings in both these nullity cases, i.e. O2016_010 relating to EP 2 347 250 B1 (see EPO Register and Swissreg ) and O2016_011 relating to EP 2 352 018 B1 (see EPO Register and Swissreg). Note that EP’018 is based on a divisional application of EP’250.

The inventions are all about the capacitive testing of yarns or fabric, wherein the dielectric property of a capacitor arrangement is determined.

Patentability

It became clear from the pleadings that the defendant’s main request in both cases was that the patent be maintained in amended form only. In my understanding, the expert-opinion of the judge-rapporteur had held that the main request in O2016_010 / EP’250 was allowable, but not in O2016_011EP’018.

Novelty has not been an issue anymore, in both cases. Only obviousness, undue extension of subject-matter (interim generalisation) and clarity (of the additional feature) have been discussed. D2 (US 4,843,879; referred to in EP’250, ¶[0007]) was apparently agreed to be the closest prior art, and was combined in the assessment of obviousness with either D4 or D11 — both of which have unfortunately not been identified.

For me as a chemist, the highlight of the day was the plaintiff’s emotional release:

That’s not chemistry here; it’s physics!

The formulation of the ‘objective technical problem’ was quite a big deal in the hearing. This is what EP’250 says in ¶[0009] (emphasis added):

It is therefore the aim of the present invention to provide a method for the symmetry adjustment of a device for the capacitive examination of a moving elongated textile test sample which does not have the above disadvantages. The device should be simple, fast, cost-effective and, in particular, automatically adjustable.

Flower power, with roses in particular

Now, can automation be considered as the ‘objective technical problem’? In the plaintiff’s view, the ‘in particular’ is an emphasis of the aim of automation. The defendant disagreed: Automation was an add-on, and the other advantages could well be realised without automation. On the funny side, the following example has been used:

She likes flowers, in particular roses.

Now, imagine that the rose-loving woman visits a florist. Which flowers will she recognise first, amidst all the other flowers? The roses, of course!

Costs

Compensation of the ‘necessary expenses’ for the assisting patent attorney pursuant to Art. 3 lit. a and Art. 9(2) CostR-PatC was yet another point of discussion. The plaintiff requested reimbursement of about kCHF 45 for each case and argued, that the defendant triggered the additional costs because the amended claims had only been filed with the rejoinder which then had effectively restarted the whole discussion. I did not get the value in dispute, but the presiding judge indicated that kCHF 45 is about twice as much as the amount that would be awarded for legal respresentation, i.e. ‘according to the tariff’ that is based on the value in dispute.

Now, why is that important?

Since O2012_043, the FPC’s practice is that, as a rule, the ‘necessary expenses’ for the patent attorney may well be within the same order of magnitude of the costs for legal representation. But what about nullity cases? A patent attorney could do that on his/her own, without any legal representative; Art. 29(1) PatCA. Compensation would then be awarded according to the tariff for legal representatives; Art. 9(2) CostR-PatC.

The defendant questioned whether costs incurred for the assisting patent attorney are ‘necessary expenses’ at all, on top of the costs for legal representation according to the tariff, if he/she could have done the whole case on his own.

Use of the technical infrastructure in the court room

It is quite hard for the public to follow the arguments when the representatives just argue with acronyms and references. It’s sometimes frustrating, but I got used to it. But still, one of the basic ideas of a public hearing is to give the public the opportunity to follow the proceedings, isn’t it? But how would you even get a glimpse of what is really at stake when the parties only refer to ‘EP’111’ or ‘D1’ or ‘feature 1da’. That’s not information — it’s just noise.

I was very happy that the recent hearing in case S2018_006 was different (see this Blog here): Whenever someone referred to a specific document, the President put the same on the screen for it to be easily recognisable by the whole audience and the judges; projector and screen are fixedly installed in the ceiling anyway (see yellow arrow in the image below). Much appreciated!

Let there be information …

But that’s not only great for the audience; I strongly feel that it is also beneficial for representatives when arguing their case. When referring to a certain paragraph in a specific document in your pleadings, or a technical drawing, you always want to make sure that all the judges are on the same page, right? But how would you know that, with the judges sitting on a podium that even has an elevated front side that makes sure that nobody reveals a hand up there, behind the monitors. Yes, there are fixedly installed monitors (green arrows in the above image).

Now, did they all pick up the document that you are upon to discuss? You never know. So, why not actually use the monitors that each judge has in front of him/her, and the projector/screen for the audience, to make sure that everybody sees what you want to be seen? I could not think of any more powerful way to focus the discussion and thoughts on a specific argument.

Unfortunately, it didn’t work out that way in this hearing even though the defendant suggested it. I hope this was for technical reasons only, and does not indicate a general change of practice again.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case Nos. O2016_010, O2016_011 | Hearing of 20 March 2019

Gebr. Loepfe AG
./.
Uster Technologies AG

Panel of Judges:

  • Frank SCHNYDER
  • Dr. Tobias BREMI
  • Christoph MÜLLER

Judge-rapporteur:

  • n/a

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

  • Dr. Simon HOLZER (MLL)
  • Dr. Kurt SUTTER (Blum), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant:

  • Dr. Andri HESS (Homburger)
  • Dr. Pavel PLISKA (inhouse)

O2016_010

Official announcement:

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Patent in suit:

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O2016_011

Official announcement:

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Patent in suit:

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Writing instrument: The Supreme Court’s final stroke

Case Nos. 4A_435/2018, 4A_441/2018 (Supreme Court) | Decision of 29 January 2019 on appeal against O2015_018 (FPC) | Decision of 15 June 2018 | ‘Instrument d’écriture’

Please see this Blog here for a detailed review of the underlying decision of the FPC in this matter.

Both parties had lodged an appeal — but the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals. While the FPC’s judgement was quite a booklet of 50+ pages, it took the Supreme Court only 7 pages to deal with both appeals. Most of the judgment indeed is pretty straight forward. Still, the judgment has quite some interesting aspects, in my perception:

  1. Assignment of a patent does not imply assignment of the universal right to the invention per se 
Montres Valgine logo

Guenat had requested that Swiss Finest‘s Swiss patent be annulled based on Art. 26(1) lit. d PatA, i.e. for lack of entitlement. However, such request can only be brought by the entitled person; Art. 28 PatA. Guenat alleged that Frédéric Garinaud transferred ‘full and complete ownership’ of the European patent application to Guenat. But that did not help. Frédéric Garinaud specifically assigned the European patent application to Guenat, but not the universal rights in the ‘invention’ itself. Guenat’s request for declaration of nullity based on Art. 26(1) lit. d PatA was thus held inadmissible for lack of standing.

On appeal, Guenat criticises the FPC’s ‘artificial dichotomy’ between the invention and the related patent application, and claims complete control over the invention in dispute. The Supreme Court didn’t buy into that. The decision holds in ¶3.2 that Guenat’s argument is based on an assumption about the parties’ intention in respect of the transfer agreement of April 2013. This is not a question of law, but of fact. But the FPC had not found that the real and common intention the parties had been to assign all intellectual property rights to the invention and the right to be granted all related patents. On the contrary, according to the FPC, the agreement in question ‘clearly refers only to the European patent application and the resulting European patent, and not to the invention as such’ — which finding is binding on the Supreme Court since it is not ‘arbitrary.’

Thus, the Supreme Court apparently had no doubt that the assignment of a specific patent does not necessarily imply the assignment of the universal rights in the invention itself.

  1. Assessment of inventive step is a question of law, but …

Guenat argued on appeal that the FPC had violated the principle of party disposition because it took facts into account that had not been alleged by the defendant.

Now, what had happened?

The FPC had held that a specific feature (C3-1) was not disclosed in the closest prior art document. Guenat had a different understanding of the specific feature, and had argued that based on a ‘correct’ understanding of the feature it had well been disclosed in the closest prior art.

Swiss Finest logo

On appeal, Guenat argued that Swiss Finest had not even alleged that feature C3-1 was not disclosed in that document. Unfortunately, it is not readily clear from the decision to which version of feature C3-1 that allegation pertained: The feature as construed by the Guenat, or the feature as construed by the FPC?

The Supreme Court held that it had not been disputed that all the factual elements necessary for the analysis of obviousness had been brought on file by the parties. Further, the Supreme Court held that Guenat had not asserted that the FPC had to supplement the facts on its own, and that such conduct was also not apparent from the file. In the Supreme Court’s view, the FPC was thus in a position to assess obviousness, which is a question of law. It is irrelevant in this respect that the presence or absence of specific features in the prior art and/or the patent have been alleged by the defendant or the plaintiff. On the basis of the facts gathered by the parties in order to consider a question of law, the court did not violate the principle of party disposition.

Without any in-depth knowledge of what had or had not been argued by the parties, I just cannot say whether I would agree with the assessment on the merits of the case. But the Supreme Court’s general considerations on questions of law vs. questions of fact trigger some further thoughts.

Clearly, assessment of obviousness is a question of law — but the underlying factual elements still need to be asserted by the parties. But what are the ‘factual elements’? They must be something more specific than just ‘the patent in suit’, ‘D1’ or the like. Else, a court could just combine whatever is on file in its assessment of obviousness, fully detached from the pleadings. This cannot be it. Now, let’s assume that both parties come up with a somewhat strange claim construction, and base all their obviousness attacks / defenses on a wrongly construed claim. In my understanding, claim construction clearly is a question of law, too (see e.g. X ZR 255/01 – ‘Bodenseitige Vereinzelungseinrichtung’ of the German Federal Supreme Court in ¶5, with further reference). But what if no party ever pointed to the relevant underlying ‘factual elements’ (i.e. specific sections of the patent in suit) that support the ‘correct’ claim construction? May the court then even come up with a different / the ‘correct’ claim construction at all?

UPDATE 21 March 2019:

Note that the FPC had held in the recent decision S2018_006 that claim construction is a question of law. In that case, both parties had not construed the feature in question at all, and the FPC came up with a construction on its own:

Wie der Begriff korrekt auszulegen ist, tragen die Beklagten hingegen ebenso wenig wie die Klägerin vor. Da die Auslegung des Patentanspruchs eine Rechtsfrage ist,15 geht die Annahme der Beklagten fehl, das Gericht dürfe den Anspruch mangels entsprechenden Vortrags der Klägerin nicht so auslegen, dass er auch etwas anderes als einen Schneidprozess erfasst.
15 Federal Supreme Court: 4A_142/2011, ¶1.3
But, again, what if both parties came up with a claim construction mutually agreed upon — but which, in the courts view, is just wrong? Or, what if both parties come up with different constructions which are both wrong in the court’s view? Can the court then correct such (a) construction(s) if it would have to rely on ‘factual elements’ that have never been pointed at by the parties, just because it is a question of law? And if that was the case, then where is the limit in the assessment of obviousness — which is a question of law, too?

The theory of separating questions of law from questions of fact is simple. But life is complicated …

On a sidenote: Wouldn’t it be good to establish common ground on what the claim actually is all about before diving any deeper? This is what a Markman hearing in the U.S. is all about. Even though I am not overly enthusiastic about quite some aspects of patent litigation in the U.S., this one certainly is useful.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. 4A_435/2018 (Supreme Court) | Decision of 29 January 2019 on appeal against O2015_018 (FPC) | Decision of 15 June 2018 | ‘Instrument d’écriture’

Guenat SA Montres Valgine (appellant)
./.
Swiss Finest SA (respondent)

and

Case No. 4A_441/2018 (Supreme Court) | Decision of 29 January 2019 on appeal against O2015_018 (FPC) | Decision of 15 June 2018 | ‘Instrument d’écriture’

Swiss Finest SA (appellant)
./.
Guenat SA Montres Valgine (respondent)
Both proceedings were jointly dealt with by the Supreme Court.

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Christina KISS
    • Dr. Kathrin KLETT
    • Dr. Fabienne HOHL

Court Clerk:

  •  Nicolas CURCHOD

Representative(s) of Guenat SA Montres Valgine:

Representative(s) of Swiss Finest SA:

  • Christoph KÜNZI (CBK)

SUPREME COURT
on appeal against O2015_018 (FPC) | Decision of 15 June 2018
Case nos.: 4A_435/2018
4A_441/2018
Decision of: 29 January 2019
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PATENT COURT
Case no.: O2015_018
Decision of: 15 June 2018

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CH 704 790 B1

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CH 704 790 C1

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EP 2 497 648 B1

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Return of the non-return valves

Reading time: 3 minutes

Case No. O2018_013 | Hearing of 18 March 2019

There you go …

These proceedings are following-up on the case O2014_002 (discussed on this Blog here in more detail) where the FPC held that certain non-return valves for urinals produced by von Allmen AG were infringing EP 1 579 133 B1.

From what has been argued at the hearing, it appears that the defendant had obtained valves from a Swiss supplier (presumably Enswico AG; meanwhile liquidated) which in turn had obtained the valves from von Allmen AG. Thus, infringement was not an issue anymore.

Based on the information obtained in proceedings O2014_002, the plaintiff alleged that Aquis Systems had obtained 17’500 infringing valves. On the contrary, Acquis Systems argued that it had only obtained 4’700 valves in total, that those valves had been produced while a license agreement had still been in place and that it had believed in good faith that a license fee of CHF 1,85 per piece had been paid to Mr Dahm. Note that the patent had initially been granted to Mr Dahm, but has been assigned to the plaintiff Daspaco AG in 2013; see Swissreg.

Further, Aquis Systems argued that Daspaco had no standig to bring this suit, since it had not been the proprietor of the patent at the relevant time.

Meeting the goal …

The presiding judge pushed the parties to have settlement discussions, given the small amounts of money involved. And, indeed, both parties agreed.

Hopefully, the parties got this resolved.

Reported by Martin WILMING

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case No. O2018_013 | Hearing of 18 March 2019

Daspaco AG
./.
Aquis Systems AG

Panel of Judges:

  • Dr. Christoph GASSER
  • Dr. Tobias BREMI
  • Dr. Ralph SCHLOSSER

Judge-rapporteur:

  • n/a

Court Clerk:

  • Susanne ANDERHALDEN

Representative(s) of Plaintiff:

  • Cyrill RIEDER (FMP)
  • Kurt STOCKER (KHP), assisting in patent matters

Representative(s) of Defendant:

  • Philip SCHNEIDER (SMS)

O2014_002
Partial decision of 21 November 2016

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ANNOUNCEMENT

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SOME LIVE NOTES


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